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TORT AND IMPLIED CONTRACT LIABILITY
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
By LESLIE L. ANDERSON*
LIABILITY ON CONTRACT AND TORT
cONGRESS AND the executive department have gone so far
in extending the sphere of federal governmental activity, as has
the Supreme Court in construing the Constitution in the light of
changing ideas about government, that it has become desirable to
make inquiry as to whether protection to the individual is keeping
reasonably apace in this transition. It is the purpose in this article
to make a limited inquiry in this direction from the angle of the
individual's right to recover from the government for its defaults,
with particular relation to claims in tort and suit in implied contract
under the Tucker Act. It also aims to suggest some protections
that ought to be given at points where injustices occur. This discussion necessarily involves consideration of the eminent domain
provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
The provisions of this Amendment set forth a principle only.
While by them private property may not be "taken for public use,
without just compensation," the Amendment does not provide the
remedy by which such compensation is to be obtained once one's
property has been taken. Nor are the constitutional provisions selfexecuting, so that without more a claimant, whose property the
*B. A., M. A., University of Minnesota, LL. B., Harvard. Member of
the (Minneapolis) Minnesota bar. Captain, J. A. G. D., and member of the
faculty of The Judge Advocate General's School at the University of Michigan.
This article is the author's personal analysis, and does not purport to be an
expression in behalf of the War Department or any of its officers or agencies.
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government has taken, may sue.1 Action will not lie against the
government except with its consent,2 and the Amendment itself
does.not constitute a consent. During normal times, moreover, Congress has generally maintained a semblance of careful control over
government expenditures. It has been slow to waive the immunity
of the federal government from suit except where it has first reasonably determined or limited the amount of future liability. The
United States has never been open to suit against it in general tort
liability,3 for instance, for one reason conceivably that the amount
of possible tort damage might be too unpredictable, although consent 'has been given to sue the government in tort under some
'In a number of instances, similar provisions in state constitutions
have been held to be self-executing and to constitute a waiver by the state
of immunity from suit brought against it to enforce their terms. Woodward
Iron Co. v. Cabaniss, (1888),87 Ala. 328, 6 So. 300; Campbell v. Arkansas
State Highway Commission, (1931) 183 Ark. 780, 38 S. W. (2d) 753; Rose
v. State, (1942) 19 Calif. (2d) 713, 123 P. (2d) 505; Board of Commissioners v. Adler, (1920) 69 Colo. 290, 194 Pac. 621, 20 A. L. R. 512; Bassett
v. Swenson, (1931) '51 Ida. 263, 5 P. (2d) 725; People v. Kelly, (1935)
361 Ill. 54, 196 N. E. 795; Pelt v. Louisiana State Live Stock Sanitary
Board, (Court of Appeal, La. 1938) 178 So. 644; (1935) Parker v. State
Highway Commission, 173 Miss. 213, 162 So. 162; (1937) Barker v. St. Louis
County, 340 Mo. 986, 104 S. W. (2d) 371; Dougherty v. Vidal, (1933) 37
N. M. 256, 21 P. (2d) 90; Morrison v. Clackama County, (1933) 141 Ore.
564, 18 P. (2d) 814; Chester County v. Brower, (1888) 117 Pa. 647, 12 At.
577, 2 Am. St. Rep. 713; Chick Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dept.,
(1930) 159 S. Car. 481, 157 S. E. 842; Nelson County v. Loving, (1919) 126
Va. 283, 101 S. E. 406; Johnson v. Parkersburg, (1880) 16 W. Va. 402, 37
Am. Rep. 779; Washington Water Power Co. v. Waters, (C. C., D. Ida.,
N. D. 1910) 186 Fed. 572.
2"A sovereign is exempt from suit ... on the ... ground that there can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the
right depends."-Holmes, J., in Kawananakoa v. Polybank, (1907) 205 U. S.
349, 353, 27 Sup. Ct. 526, 527, 51 L. Ed. 834, 836. Lynch v. United States,
(1933) 292 U. S. 571, 54 Sup. Ct. 840, 78 L. Ed. 434; Chisholm v. Georgia,
(1792) 2 Dallas 419, 1 L. Ed. 440; Gibbons v. United State6, (1868) 8 Wall.
269, 19 L. Ed. 453; Hans v. Louisiana, (1890) 134 U. S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 504,
33 L. E. 842. Eleventh Amendment, Constitution of the United States.
As to the extent to which the federal and the various state governments
have laid themselves open to suit in tort and contract, see Pound, "A Survey
of Public Interests," 58 Harv. L. Rev. 909 (1945).
"No government has ever held itself liable to individuals for the misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized exercise of power by its officers and agents,"
said Mr. Justice Miller in Gibhbons v. United States, (1868) 8 Wall. 269,
274, 19 L. Ed. 453, 454; and he added in Langford v. United States, (1879)
101 U. S. 341; 345, 25 L. Ed. 1010, 1012, that the Supreme Court will not
"subject the government to payment of damages for all the wrongs committed
by its officers or agents, under a mistaken zeal, or actuated by less worthy
motives." In Bigby v. United States, (1902) 188 U. S. 400, 23 Sup. Ct. 468,
47 L. Ed. 519, Mr. Justice Harlan suggested that no officer of the government has been given authority to commit torts, and that their authority is
limited to doing lawful acts. Mr. Justice Holmes, in United States v. Thompson, (1922) 257 U. S. 419, 42 Sup. Ct. 159, 66 L. E. 299, said in effect that
the government makes the law and therefore cannot be a wrongdoer.
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circumstances.4 . Government contracts, on the other hand, are
made only pursuant to the Constitution or to statute.5 Congress is
able to limit in advance the contractual liability which the government agents will be authorized to incur. In part at least because
the amount of possible liability on contract claims is predictable and
subject to Congressional controls in their incurrence, Congress has,
in the Tucker Act,6 waived the immunity of the government from
suit under its contracts.
The Tucker Act provides:
"The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to hear and
determine the following matters:
"First. All claims (except for pensions) founded upon the
Constitution of the United States or any law of Congress, upon any
regulation of an executive department, upon any contract, express
or implied, with the Government of -the United States, or for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort, in
respect of which claims the party would be entitled to redress
against the United States either in a court of law, equity, or
admiralty if the United States were suable... "
4(Assumption of tort liability to same extent as corporate owners while
federal government operated railroads during World War I) Federal Control Act, 40 Stat. 451 (1918). See New York ex rel Rogers v. Graves, (1936)
299 U. S. 401, 57 Sup. Ct. 269, 81 L. E. 306. (Permitting libel in personam
in admiralty for damages caused by public vessel of the United States or
for services rendered to such public vessel) Public Vessels Act of 1925, 43
Stat. 112 (1925), 46 U. S. C. 781. (Authorizing suit for government infringement of patents) 40 Stat. 705 (1910), 35 U. S. C. 68. Congress sometimes provides for the administrative determination of tort claims as distinguished from judicial determination. Federal Employees Compensation
Act, 39 Stat. 742 (1916), 5 U. S. C. 751, for instance. See Dahn v. Davis,
(1922) 258 U. S. 421, 42 Sup. Ct. 320, 66 L. Ed. 696. Cf. Panama R. Co. v.
Strobel (C. C. A. Canal Zone, 1922) 282 Fed. 52.
5
"We have no officer in this Government, from the President down to
the most subordinate agent, who does not hold office under the law, with
prescribed duties and limited authority. And while some of these, as the
President, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, exercise powers in some sense
left to more general definitions necessarily incident to fundamental law found
in the Constitution, the larger portion of them are the creation of statutory
law, with duties and powers prescribed and limited by that law."-Miller, J.,
in The Floyd Acceptances, (1868) 7 Wall. 666, 676, 19 L. Ed. 169, 174.
636 Stat. 1136 (1911), 28 U. S. C. 250; and 36 Stat. 1093 (1911) 28
U. S. C. 41 (20).
For an analysis of procedures in the light of the Tucker Act and otherwise for establishing claims pursuant to government contracts, see by the
writer, "The Disputes Article in Government Contracts," 44 Mich. L. Rdv.
211 (1945).
For a general treatment of government contracts, Grismore, "Contracts
with the United States," 22 Mich. L. Rev. 749 (1924) ; McGuire, "Matters
of Procedure under Government Contracts," (Rev. ed. 1935) ; Shealey, "The
Law of Government Contracts," (2nd ed. 1927) ; Tanney, "Government Contract Law and Administration" (1930).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

Congress has provided further in the Tucker Act that the
federal government may be sued in the United States district courts
for any of the same causes in an amount not in excess of $10,000.
Law to be Applied in Government Contracting
In suits under the Act arising out of business transactions by
the United States, it would seem that the government should not
be obliged to inform itself of the different and unusual rules
prevailing in all of -the various states as to its contracts, and inquiry
here should be largely confined to federal, and not to state, decisions. In Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins/ Mr. justice
Brandeis stated the principle as to the law to be applied in federal
courts that "except in matters governed by-the Federal'Constitution
or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law
of the State. And whether the law of the State shall be declared
by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a dedsion
is not a matter of federal concern." 8 Since government contracts
are made only pursuant to the Constitution or to authority from
Congress, it would follow that they should not be governed by state
law and that federal law only should be applied to them. It has
been so held specifically, as to commercial paper issued by the
government,9 and some state court decisions have recognized that
Treasury Regulations control as to the ownership of registered
7(1938) 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188. Notes in 22 Minn.
L. Rev. 885 (1938), 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 896 (1938), and 24 Va. L. Rev.
895 (1938).
8
Variations of problems in applying state law. Vanderbark v. OwensIllinois Glass Co., (1941) 311 U. S. 538, 61 Sup. Ct. 347, 85 L. Ed. 327-;
(1944) Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U. S. 232, 64 Sup. Ct. 1015, 88 L. Ed. 1246;
(1940) Fidelity Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U. S. 169, 61 Sup. Ct. 176, 85 L. Ed.
10; (1940) West v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 311 U. S. 223,
61 Sup. Ct. 179, 85 L. Ed. 139. Note in 89 of Pa. L. Rev. 520 (1941) ; (1943)
Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U. S. 228, 64 Sup. Ct. 7, 88 L. Ed. 9; notes
in 39 Mich. L. Rev. 818 (1941) and 92 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 330 (1944) ; (1945)
McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U. S. 365, 65 Sup. Ct. 405, 89 L. Ed. 389;
note in 31 Va. L. Rev. 984 (1943). The United States Supreme Court attempted to advise the Supreme Court of Nebraska, (1945) Radio Station
WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 65 Sup. Ct. 1475, 1482, 89 L. Ed. 1397, 1403. The
state Court answered back. Johnson v. Radio Station WOW, Inc., (Neb.
1945) 19 N. W. (2d) 853.
9
"The application of the state law, even without the conflict of laws
rules of the forum, would subject the rights and duties of the United States
to exceptional uncertainty. It wotld lead to great diversity in results by making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several
states. The desirability of a uniform rule is plain.'-Douglas, J., in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, (1943) 318 U. S. 363, 367, 63 Sup. Ct. 573,
575, 87 L. Ed. 838, 842; note in 43 Col. L. Rev. 520 (1943).
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United States War Savings bonds. 10 Neither the Supreme Court
nor the Court of Claims has ever made a practice of bothering
itself much about state law in government contract cases. Federal
projects can be prosecuted with more facility from a central office
if the national authorities are not hampered by possible variations
in the law of contracts from state to state. Moreover, if state law
were to control in the field of government contracting, recalcitrant
state legislatures might even attempt to thwart some federal projects.
The consent of the federal government to be sued in contract
should, therefore, properly be construed to be one for suit under
its own contract rules except as a contrary intention is clear." A
body of federal common law is inevitably to be relied upon to
govern business transactions between the United States and private
contractors. 2
Implied in Law Contracts
The Tucker Act, it will be observed, permits suits against
the government on implied contracts, but does not specify whether
such contracts must be those implied in fact or those implied in
law, or whether both are within its purview. Contracts implied in
law are not actually contracts at all, but arise under such circumstances that the courts impose liability as if they had been con0
Murray v. Muldoon, (Ia. 1945) 20 N. W. (2d) 49; Harvey v. Rackliffe, (Me. 1945) 41 A. (2d) 455. State law will not be permitted to thwart
the federal policy involved in the Sherman law. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson
Electric Co., (1942) 317 U. S. 173, 63 Sup. Ct. 172, 87 L. Ed. 165; notes in
56 Harv. L. Rev. 814 (1943) and 41 Mich. L. Rev. 984 (1943).
"In case of a war contract made pursuant to the Congressional power
to raise and support Armies, "it must be accepted as an act of the Federal
Government warranted by the Constitution and regular under statute. Procurement policies so settled under federal authority may not be defeated or
limited by state law. The purpose of the supremacy clause was to avoid the

introduction of disparities, confusions and conflicts which would follow if
the Government's general authority were subject to local controls. The
validity and construction of contracts through which the United States is
exercising its constitutional functions, their consequences on the rights and
obligations of the parties, the titles or liens which they create or permit, all
present questions of federal law not controlled by the law of any state."-Jackson, J., in United States v. Allegheny County, (1943) 322 U. S. 174,
182, 64 Sup. Ct. 908, 913, 88 L. Ed. 1209, 1217. See Kemp v. United States,
(D. Md., 1941) 38 F. Supp. 568.
12 Even as in the case of commercial paper issued by the United States.
"And while the federal law merchant, developed for about a century under
the regime of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, represented general commercial law
rather than a choice of a federal rule designed to protect a federal right, it
nevertheless stands as a convenient source of reference for fashioning federal
rules applicable to those federal questions."--Douglas, J., in Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, supra, footnote 8.

/
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tracts.13 Known generally as quasi-contracts, their obligation arises
in large part from moral and equitable considerations as distinguished from agreement. Certain of the same consideratioris that
would lead Congress not to waive the immunity of the government
from general tort liability apply in the case of quasi-contracts, even
though the statute could probably have been construed originally
to permit the courts to take jurisdiction over them. They are surely
of the contracts family. DuringWorld War II, it has become apparent that making technical distinctions between the two types
of implied contracts might impede speedy war procurement; and
suit on contracts implied in law in the field of war contracting
came to be specifically permitted by the Contract Settlement Act
of 1944.'4 In any event, contracts implied in law have been held
not to be included within the purview of the Tucker Act. 5 Govern-'
merit contracts under the statute must be either express or implied
in fact.
It is difficult to justify on principle the government's unwillingness in normal times to hold itself accountable to the full standard
of fairness and morality to which private parties are held. Treatment of the excluded category of contracts implied in law, moreover, has'seemed to be not without some taint of inconsistency.
Where the government has occupied the property of a claimant"
without first entering into a lease in writing, it has been treated
13Woodward, "Quasi Contracts" (1912), Sec. 1. Williston and Thomp-

son, "Williston on Contracts" (Rev. ed. 1936), Sec. 3. "It has long been
settled by decisions of this court that the -word 'contracts' in Sec. 10 of
Article I of the Constitution is used in its usual or popular sense as signifying an agreement of two or more minds, upon sufficient consideration, to do
or not to do certain acts. 'Mutual assent' [express or implied] to its terms is
of its very essence.' "-Clarke, J., in Crane v. Hablo, (1922) 258 U. S. 142,
146, 42 Sup. Ct. 214, 215, 66 L. Ed. 514, 517.
1458 Stat. 658 (1944), 41 U. S. C. 101. After setting forth procedures for
prosecution of claims under war'contracts (Secs. 13 and 14), the Act pro-vides in Sec. 17: "(b) Whenever any formal or technical defect or omission
in any prime contract, or in any grant of authority to an officer or agent of
a contracting agency who ordered any materials, services, and facilities might
invalidate the contract or commitment, the contracting agency (1) shall not
take advantage of such defect or omission; (2) shall amend, confirm, or
ratify such contract or commitment without consideration in order to cure
such defect or omission; and (3) shall mak a fair settlement of any obligation thereby created or incurred by such agency, whether expressed or implied, in fact or in law, or in the nature of an implied or quasi contract."
IsUnited States v. Minnesota Investment Co., (1926) 271 U. S. 212,
217, 46 Sup. Ct. 501, 503, 70 L. Ed. 911, 913; Merritt v. United States,
(1925) 267 U. S.338, 45 Sup. Ct. 278, 69 L. Ed. 643; Baltimore & Ohio Rd.
Co. v. United States, (1923) 261 U. S.592, 43 Sup. Ct. 425, 67 L. Ed. 816;
Sutton, Trustee v. United States, (1921) 256 U. S.575, 41 Sup. Ct. 563, 65
L. Ed. 1099; American LaFrance Fire Engine Co. Inc. v. Borough of Shanandoah, (C.C.A. 3rd, 1940) 115 F. (2d) 866.
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as an occupant under a lease implied in fact.Y6 Where its occupancy
has been under a written lease not mentioning the subject of
waste, it has been held that an agreement implied in fact not to
commit waste should be read into the transaction.' 7 On the other
hand, where the established law of Ohio, where premises were
situated, was that a lessee holding over after the expiration of a
lease for a year was bound for another year at the option of the
lessor despite the lessee's intention not to be bound for the entire
new year,'" the courts have refused to apply the rule against the
government since Ohio courts had referred to it as an obligation
implied in law. 19 This latter decision was made prior to Erie
Railroad Company v. Tompkins, supra, and the position could
easily have been taken that the courts were simply unwilling to
apply state law. It is doubtful that the decision would have been
different had no mention been made of the subject of obligations
implied at law but the Ohio rule had been imposed by an Ohio
statute.
Nature of Implied in Fact Contract
The contract implied in fact is based upon an agreement between the parties. It is the sort of thing to which Congress is
' 6 Willink v. United States, (1903) 38 Ct. Cl. 693; Mills v. United States,
(1884) 19 Ct. C1. 79; Johnson v. United States, (1872) 8 Ct. Cl. 243; Johnson v. United States, (1868) 4 Ct. Cl. 248. Cf. Eastern Building Corp. v.
States, (1942) 96 Ct Cl. 399.
United
17 United States v. Bostwick, 94 U. S. 53, 24 L. Ed. 65 (1876) ; Italian
National Rifle Shooting Society v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 418 (1928) ; New
Rawson Corp. v. United States, (D. Mass., 1943) 55 F. Supp. 291; 23 Comp.
Gen. 477 (1944). The government took an owner's steamer on a trial voyage
preliminary to purchasing it, with an oral agreement to pay for it should the
steamer be lost on the trip. It was lost through no fault of the government.
The express contract to pay for the steamer failed for want of a writing;
but the Supreme Court recognized a simple bailment for hire in the relationship between the parties, and declared in essence that there was an implied
contract to abide by the usual incidents of such a relationship. Thus the
government would have been liable for the value of the steamer had the loss
occurred from negligence. Clark v. United States, 95 U. S. 539, 24 L. Ed.
18 (1877). Subject discussed in Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance
Corp., 306 U. S. 395, 59 Sup. Ct. 521, 83 L. Ed. 792 (1939); Petition of
S. R. A., Inc., (Minn.) 18 N. W. (2d) 442 (1945).
'SBumiller v. Walker, (1917) 95 Ohio St. 344; Baltimore & Ohio Rd.
Co. v. West, (1897) 57 Ohio St. 161.
'oGoodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States, (1928) 276 U. S. 287,
48 Sup. Ct. 306, 72 L. Ed. 575. Cf. variations in government lease cases:
Raymond Commerce Corp. v. United States, (1941) 93 Ct. Cl. 698; Freedman's Savings & Trust Co. v. United States, (1880) 16 Ct. Cl. 19. See also
Leiter v. United States, (1926) 271 U. S. 204, 46 Sup. Ct. 477, 70 L. Ed. 906;
Bradley v. United States, (1878) 98 U. S. 104, 25 L. Ed. 105; Reed Smoot
v. United States, (1903) 38 Ct. Cl. 418; New York Central Railroad v.
United States, (1886) 21 Ct. Cl. 468; McCollum's Case, (1881) 17 Ct. Cl.
92.
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able to give advance authorization. Unexpected state rules cannot
generally be imported into it. An intention must appear on both
sides. The mental elements constituting a bargain must be found,
even as it must appear in cases of express contract. The person
conferring the benefit on the government must expect to be paid
for it,20 and the government to pay. 21 Since there is no valid
written agreement, the intention must be found in the circumstances
surrounding the transaction. 22 The mental element is often obscure.
Yet in government contracting, principles set forth in the Constitution, as the eminent domain protective principle of the Fifth
Amendment referred to already, or in statutes, or arising out of
recognized changed conditions and public attitudes, help in arriving
at a conclusion as to what one would expect to be intended in the
absence of facts otherwise negativing the intention of one of the
parties to do some certain thing.
It is an every-day occurrence in private enterprise for shoppers
to lift items from counters in stores and for clerks to reach out for
payment, with hardly a word passing between them. Transactions
of purchase and sale iake place regularly without advance discussions as to terms. Custom constitutes part of the surrounding
circumstances and supplies what has been without expression in
language. Society expects one to intend payment for what he takes
rather than to do a wrongful act. There is no less reason to expect
that government will likewise expect to pay for what it takes, and
especially when custom is reinforced with some principle which
20

Coleman v. United States, (1893) 152 U. S. 96, 14 Sup. Ct. 473, 38
L. Ed. 368, suggesting, however, that the circumstances under which a party
performs may justify a reasonable expectation of payment, and that from this
a promise to pay -will be implied. If it is specified in advance of performance
that the government will not pay, there will be no recovery in implied contract. United States v. McDonald (C. C. A. 9th, 1896) 72 Fed. 898. See
Lombard
v. Rahilly, (1914) 127 Minn. 449, 149 N. W. 950.
21
Where one builds or repairs a structure on land belonging to the
government without its consent, the government is not liable even though it
sees fit to use the structure instead of tearing it down, United States v.
Pacific Railroad, (1887) 120 U. S. 227, 7 Sup. Ct. 490, 30 L. Ed. 634; Sutton
Trustee v. United States, (1921) 265 U. S. 575, 415 Sup. Ct. 563, 65 L. Ed.
1099. Cf. variations of cases, Karon v. Kellogg, (1935) 195 Minn. 134, 261
N. W. 861; Canal Bank v. Hudson, (1884) 111 U. S. 66, 4 Sup. Ct. 303, 28
L. Ed. 354; Green v. Biddle, (1823) 8 Wheat. 1, 5 L. Ed. 547; Armstrong,
Receiver v. Ashley, (1907) 204 U. S. 272, 27 Sup. Ct. 270, 51 L. Ed. 482.
221 Williston and Thompson, "Williston on Contracts," (Rev. ed. 1936)
Sec. 3. "A contract implied in fact is one inferred from the circumstances or
acts of the parties . . . "-Sutherland, J., in Klebe v. United States, (1923)
263 U. S. 188, 192, 44 Sup. Ct. 58, 59, 68 L. Ed. 244, 247. "A contract implied
in fact requires a meeting of the minds, just as much as an express contract.
The difference between the two is largely in the character of the evidence by
which they are established."-Dibell, C., in Lombard v. Rahilly, (1914) 127
Minn. 449, 450, 149 N. W. 950.

TORT AND IMPLIED CONTRACT LIABILITY

has sanctity because it is in the Constitution. Taking under the
power of eminent domain is considered later in this article. It is
mentioned at this point because it is so intimately related to the
subject at hand. The power of government to take private property
certainly arises without regard to any law of contracts or purchase
and sale ;23 but in practice, the right to payment for what the
government has taken developed in the United States at least in
geueral conformity with that law, and distinctions between many
eminent domain cases are explainable on the basis of contract rules.
Various details of a particular implied contract may be
expressed in a writing which is not complete enough to constitute
an express contract. Or a writing may fail as an attempted express
contract because there has not been an adequate compliance with
some of the few formalities provided by the statutes and peculiar
to government contracting; but it may still serve as evidence of
the intentions of the parties. One of such statutes is that which
requires advertising to precede purchases of supplies and services,
except where a contract is to be made for personal services or
where there is a public exigency which requires immediate delivery
or performance. 24 It may be observed parenthetically that both
war with its urgent need for help from private enterprise2 5 and a
depression requiring the government to put many jobless men to
work at an early date 26 are public exigencies. Delivery or performance with relation to them at a date as reasonably soon as
practicable under the circumstances satisfies the requirement of a
need for immediate performance..2 7 Delivery within thirty days
has been treated in such cases as dearly immediate enough under
facts there existing so that -itis proper to purchase without advertis23Lenhoff, "Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain," in 42
Col. L. Rev. 596 (1942). United States v. A Certain Tract, (S. D. Ga.,
1942) 44 F. Supp. 712, 715; State v. Flach, (1942) 213 Minn. 353, 356, 6
N. W. (2d) 805, 807; State v. Severson, (1935) 194 Minn. 644, 261 N. W. 469.
4R. S. 3709, 41 U. S. C. 5.
25
American Smelting and Refining Co. v. United States, (1922) 259 U. S.
75, 42 Sup. Ct. 420, 66 L. Ed. 833; Totten, Administrator v. United States,
(1875) 92 U. S. 105, 23 L. Ed. 605; The Stevens Case, (1866) 2 Ct. Cl. 95.
Further exemption from advertising in World War II procurement. First
War Powers Act, 55 Stat. 838 (1941), 50 U. S. C., App. 601 et seq; E. 0.
9001, December 27, 1941, 6 Fed9 Reg. 6787, as amended by E. 0. 9296, January 3, 1943, 8 Fed. Reg. 1429.
26Good Roads Machinery Co. v. United States, (D. Mass., 1937) 19 F.
Supp. 652. Cf. 14 Comp. Gen. 875 (1935) where a contracting officer on a
Civil Works project waited until an emergency occurred which he should
have known well in advance would inevitably occur and then attempted to
purchase without advertising. See McKeimey v. United States (1868) 4 Ct.

Cl. 537.

27American Smelting and Refining Co. v. United States, supra,footnote 25.
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ing.2s Some statutes specifically permit some purchases in varying

small amounts without advertising by specified government departments and agencies.29

Contracts are generally required to be in

writing by other statutes. A statute as to the War Department,
for instance, requires that they be in writing and signed by the
parties if in an amount in excess of five hundred dollars and if
not to be performed within sixty days.80
The requirements of both advertising and a formal contract
are for the benefit of the government only.31 Thus the statute requiring a written contract differs from a Statute of Frauds in
private contract -law. 8 2 While the contractor cannot hold the
government to the terms of an express contract if it is not in
writing,83 the government can hold the contractor to its terms. 34
However, although the contractor may not hold the government
on the express contiact, he may nevertheless recover in quantum
meruit on a contract implied in fact to the extent of the benefit
conferred upon it or the reasonable value of the part of the agreement already performed. " Here the intention of the parties was
2SAmerican Smelting and Refining Co. v. United States, msopra, footnote
25; Good
Roads Machinery Co. v. United States, mspra, footnote 26.
29See, for example, 54 Stat. 1109 (1940), 41 U. S. C. 6.
8046 Stat. 796 (1930), 5 U. S. C. 219.
81"Section 3709 ...was not enacted for the protection of sellers and confers no enforceable rights upon prospective bidders. 'The United States needs
the protection of publicity, form, regularity of returns and affidavit (Revised
Stats. Secs. 3709, 3718-3724, 3745-3747), in order to prevent possible frauds
upon it by others. A private person needs no such protection against a written
undertaking signed by himself. The duty is imposed upon the officers of the
Government and not upon him.' That duty is owing to the Government and
to no one else."-Black, J., in Perkins, Sec. of Labor v. Lukens Steel Co.,
(1940) 310 U. S.113, 126, 60 Sup. Ct. 869, 876, 84 L. Ed. 1108, 1114. Cf. Stark
v. Wickard, Sec. of Agriculture, (1944) 321 U. S.288, 64 Sup. Ct. 59, 88
L. Ed. 510. See also O'Brien v. Carney, (D. Mass., 1934) 6 F. Supp. 761;
B. F. Cummings Co. v. Burleson, (1913) 40 App. D. C. 500; Champion Coated
Paper Co. v. Joint Committee on Printing, (1917) 47 App. D. C. 141; Hearing
before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 71st Cong.,
2nd Sess., on H. R. 5568, Serial 4, Part 1, pp. 16-22, 26-27; Senate Report 433,
74th Cong.,
1st Sess.
I2Ackerlind, Admr. v. United States, (1916) 240 U. S.531, 36 Sup. Ct.
438, 60 L. Ed. 783.
33Erie Coal and Coke Corp. v. United States, (1924) 266 U. S. 518, 45
Sup. 4Ct. 181, 69 L. Ed. 417; Gillioz v. United States, (1944) 102 Ct. Cl. 454,
8 Ainerican Smelting and Refining Co. v. United States, srupra, footnote 25.
United States v. N. Y.'and Porto Rico Steamship Co., (1915) 239 U. S.88,
36 Sup. Ct. 41, 60 L. Ed. 161; Emery v. United States, (D. Conn., 1926) 13 F.
(2d) 658. An analogous type of case, Baltimore & Ohio Rd. Co. v. Groeger,
Afdmx.,
(1925) 266 U. S.521, 45 Sup. Ct. 169, 69 L. Ee 419.
S3 In Willard, Sutherland & Co. v. United States, (1923) 262 U. S. 489,
494, 43 Sup. Ct. 592, 94, 67 L. Ed. 1086, 1089, Mr. Justice Butler explained
that the contract was not enforceable against the government prior to any
performance,, but added, "By the conduct and performance of the parties,
the contract was made definite and binding as to the 11,000 tons ordered and
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clear from the beginning that the contractor be paid at least for
what he may have delivered within the limits of the written agreement. The language used by the parties is evidence to establish the
intention even though the express contract may fail for want of
advertising or a writing.
On the other hand, government standard forms contain what
is known as a "Changes" article, which permits the government
contracting officer to order in writing certain changes in the drawings or specifications which set forth the subject matter of the
contract. If the changes so ordered require an increase or decrease
in the amount due under the contract, an equitable adjustment shall
be made. In the event the estimated increase or decrease exceeds
five hundred dollars, no change shall be ordered, by the language of
the "Changes" article, except upon the approval in writing of the
head of the department or his authorized representative. 86 An implied in fact contract problem arises occasionally where the estimated increase or decrease in cost for changes ordered exceeds five
hundred dollars but no prior written approval from the head of the
department or his representative has been obtained. Variations in
further facts might be suggested.
The contracting officer and the contractor may disagree with
each other as to whether what is ordered does in fact constitute a
change or whether it is required already by the drawings and
specifications. If the contractor does not remonstrate to the contracting officer but performs without protest, he will have waived
any right to additional recovery by reason of his cooperation. 37 He
delivered according to its terms." See also United States v. Andrews & Co.,
(1907) 207 U. S. 229, 28 Sup. Ct. 100, 52 L. Ed. 185; St. Louis Hay and Grain
Co. v. United States, 191 U. S.159, 24 Sup. Ct. 47, 48 L. Ed. 130 (1903) ;
Saulsbury Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., (C. C. A. 10th, 1944) 142 F.
(2d) 27; Gorman v..United States, (1944) 102 Ct. Cl. 260; W. H. Armstrong
& Co. v. United States, (1943) 98 Ct. Cl. 519.
36
The requirement that change orders involving an estimated increase or
decrease of more than five hundred dollars be approved in writing by the
head of the department or his representative necessarily would hamper a large
procurement program where speed is necessary. Consequently, it does not
appear in most war contracts during World War II.
37Silberblatt & Lasker, Inc. v. United States, (1944) 101 Ct. Cl. 54;
McGlone v. United States, (1942) 96 Ct. Cl. 507; American Bridge Co. v.
United States (W. D. Pa., 1938) 25 F. Supp. 714. Moreover, the specifications to the contract may contain a clause making the government contracting
officer the interpreter of the drawings and specifications. If there is such a
clause, the contractor will not be able to recover even though he does protest.
Sometimes government contracts contain a kind of Disputes article that will
permit him to appeal to the head of the government department or his authorized representative within 30 days. Sometimes, this right of appeal is taken
away either by restricted language in the Disputes article or by language in
the specifications making the interpretation by the contracting officer final.
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has performed work in disregard of the expressed intention of the
government without first asserting his own intention and declaring
a breach to'exist. If he protests but feels obliged to perform the
oadditional work to protect himself even though the contracting
officer refuses to give him a written change order, it has been held
that he will be able to recover for it in implied contract.38 One
difficulty with that solution is that the standard "Changes" article
requires the written approval of the additional cost by the head of
the department, and the solution disregards the approval. If the
head of the department stands by with full knowledge of the work
which has been ordered, however, the problem seems not difficult
by analogy to other cases of benefit conferred by oral arrangement.
The insistence of the contracting officer and the silent acquiescence
of the head of the department in the conferring of the benefit by
the contractor would, by custom, be expected to include an intention that the contractor be reimbursed for his additional expense.
The parties have had a difference of opinion, and the government
position should be that it will abide by watever the courts finally
decide the proper interpretation of the contract to be.
Suppose, again, that both parties agree that what is ordered is
a change involving an increase of over five hundred dollars, but the
contractor still does the work by order of the contracting officer but
without waiting for the prior written approval of the head of the
department. The position the courts would take at this point is not
too well established. If the head of the department does not know
of the additional cost incurred by the contractor until after the work
has been performed, it is clear 'that there would be no right of recovery on any theory. The purpose of requiring the approval of the
head of a department is directed toward keeping control over subordinate officers by officials having the ultimate responsibility of
the project.39 This reason in itself would seem to 'be satisfied where
the department head stands by and knows the additional work is
being performed even in the absence of any written approval by
38Davis and Fowler, Trustees v. United States, (1936) 82 Ct. Cl. 334.
If the contracting officer's interpretation was correct, the contractor will not
have the additional recovery. Diamond v. United States, (1943) 98 Ct. Cl. 428.
The contractor may. choose to hold to his position against the contracting
officer, cease the work, and declare a breach because of the government's insistence upon the additional work without giving him a change order. In
doing so, his risk is that the court may determine him to be in error and to
have breached the contract. Occasionally, a change order does not effect the
cost of performance, as when it calls for a change in the color of paint to
be used.
39
Filor v. United States, (1869) 9 Wall. 45, 19 L. Ed. 549.
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him. It may be inquired furthery though, whether the requirement
of an approval in writing should not be treated as an important
procedural step in pressing a claim for an additional sum. The
Supreme Court has once refused extra recovery on the ground alone
of the failure of a written approval. 40 The reason, however, seems
a flimsy one for denying recovery where the government has received the benefit. The Court in that case sustained the position
of the Court of Claims below. However, in a more recent decision,
the Court of Claims has quite reversed its previous position; 41 and
it is believed the Supreme Court might hereafter take the stand
that recovery should not be denied simply on the ground of noncompliance with the evidentiary requirement that a change order
or approval be in writing.
The authority of the government officer to receive the benefit
or performance for the government must be established in some
manner, however, before recovery in implied in fact contract will
be allowed. Without authority to make an express contract, he has
no authority to bind the government in implied contract. 42 Mere
benefit conferred is not in itself a basis for recovery against the
40

"In every instance it was necessary that the change should be approved
by the Secretary. There was a total failure to comply with these provisions,
and though it may be a hard case, since the court found that the work was in
fact extra and of considerable value, yet Plumley cannot recover for that
which, though extra, was not ordered by the officer and in the manner required by the contract."-Lamar, J., in Plumley v. United States, (1903) 226
U. S.545, 547, 33 Sup. Ct. 139, 140, 57 L. Ed. 342, 344. Cf. Seim v. Independent
District of Monroe, (S. Dak., (1945) 17 N. W. (2d) 342. A change order
cannot bind the government to pay more than is specified in the statute for
the project to be performed. Shipman v. United States, (1883) 18 Ct. Cl. 138;
Trenton v. United States, (1876) 12 Ct. Cl. 147; Curtis v. United States,
(1866) 2 Ct. Cl. 144.
41
"We recognize that the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Plumley v. United States, 226 U. S. 545, is contrary to what we have
said. We see no distinction, in principle, between that case and the cases of
United States v. Andrews and St. Louis Hay and Grain Co. v. United States,
discussed above. All the authorities in comparable legal situations are in accord with the latter cases, and we think it is our duty to follow this general
trend of authority, which leads to what we regard as .a just decision,
rather than the Panley case, which seems to stand alone."-Madden, J.,
in W. H. Armstrong and Co. v. United States, (1943) 98 Ct. Cl. 519, 530.
42
Sutton, Trustee v. United States, (1921) 256 U. S. 575, 41 Sup. Ct. 563,
65 L. Ed. 1099; United States v. North American Transportation and Trading Co., (1919) 253 U. S. 330, 40 Sup. Ct. 518, 64 L. Ed. 935; Beach v. United
States, (1912) 226 U. S. 243, 33 Sup. Ct 20, 57 L. Ed. 205; Bigby v. United
States, 188 U. S.400, 23 Sup. Ct.468, 47 L. Ed. 519 (1903) ; Rankin v. United
States, (1943) 98 Ct.Cl. 357. Or if an express contract covers a certain subject,
conflicting rights cannot be implied as to the same subject. Hawkins v. United
States, (1877) 96 U. S. 689, 24 L. Ed. 607; Board of Trustees of National
Training School v. 0. D. Wilson Co., Inc., (U. S. Ct. App., D. C., 1943)
133 F. Supp. 399.
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United States.43 With so many government employees as there are,
close controls over them are not feasible. As a departure from the
law of agency in private contracting, the United States will not be
bound by the mere apparent authority of its agent. Unless the
actual authority of a government agent is established, no recovery
may be had whether on a theory of express or implied contract."4
The authority itself, however, may be implied from some other
authority that has been granted.45 Although it has been said that
the government will not be estopped by the acts of its agents and
will not be bound by their laches, 46 in some cases their laches have
been held to bind the government. 47 Moreover, the burden upon
the contractor to make sure of the government contracting officer's
actual authority stands in the way of speedy procurement. The
Contract Settlement Act of 1944 accordingly provided for fair compensation to persons furnishing or arranging to furnish war materials to the government with relation to World War II in reliance
upon apparent authority. 4 Compensation is made under the Contract Settlement Act even though no materials are furnished or
43Baltimore & Ohio Rd. Co. v. United States, (1923) 261 V. S.592, 43
Sup. Ct. 425, 67 L. Ed. 816; Eastern Extension, Australasia & China Telegraph Co. v. United States, (1920) 251 U. S. 355, 40 Sup. Ct. 168, 64 L. Ed.
305; United States v. North American Transportation and Trading Co.,
.supra, footnote 42. Hooe v. United States, (1910) 218 U. S. 322, 31 Sup. Ct.
85, 54 L. Ed. 1055.
44Whiteside v. United States, (1876) 93 U. S.247, 23 L. Ed. 882; United
States v. Foster, (C. C. A. 8th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 3; United States v.
Christensen, (E. D. Ill., 1943) 50 F. Supp. 30; United States v. Gudewicz,
(E. D.
45 N. Y., 1942) 45 F. Supp. 787.
Thus from a duty imposed by Congress upon a public official to store
certain materials for which he has no storage space may be implied authority
to bind the government for the rental of such space. Rives v. United States,
(1893) 28 Ct. Cl. 249.
46",... the government is not responsible for the laches, however gross,

of its officers."-Miller, J., in Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. 269, 275, 19
L. Ed. 453, 454 (1869). " . . . the real authority of the agent is defined by

a public statute, of which every person is bound to take notice. From the
latter fact it follows that there can be no foothold for an estoppel in the
case."--Berry,
J., in Reed, as Warden v. Seymour, (1877) 24 Minn.273, 280.
47
Dealing with commercial paper, Mr. Justice Douglas said in Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, (1942) 318 U. S. 363, 369, 63 Sup. Ct. 573, 576,
87 L. Ed. 838, 840. "If it is shown that the drawee on learning of the forgery
did not give prompt notice of it and- that damage resulted, recovery by the
drawee is barred. (Citation of'cases.) The fact that the drawee is the United
States and the laches those of its employees are not material."
4sSec.'17. "(a) Where any person has arranged to furnish or furnished
to a contracting agency or to -a war contractor any materials, services, or
facilities- related to the prosecution of the war, without a formal contract,
relying in good faith upon the apparent authority of an officer or agent of a
contracting agency, written or oral instructions, or any other request to proceed from a contracting agency, the contracting agency shall pay such person
fair compensation therefor."
For section 17(b) of the Act, see supra, footnote 14.
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benefit is conferred to the government beyond that of preparations
preliminary to furnishing war materials.
Damages
Recovery in implied contract has been said to be measured by
the amount of the benefit actually conferred. 49 This is generally
true, but it is submitted that the measure is not established to be so
limited universally. In the instance already given of the government's implied in fact agreement not to commit waste on property
under a lease which does not expressly mention waste, it is difficult
to find the benefit conferred for which the government is bound to
pay. For example, if a government employee negligently handles
a steam boiler on the premises so that it explodes, the government's
implied obligation is to pay for the destruction and damage done.50
The government receives no benefit in exchange. Ordinarily, however, benefit to the government is established, and damages in implied contract are limited to payment for the benefit conferred.
The boiler case just mentioned does involve damage or destruction
proximately incident or consequential to benefits that do exist in a
landlord and tenant relationship.
In most cases, the recovery is of the reasonable yalue of the
benefit conferred; and the reasonable value of a benefit is treated
ordinarily as being the fair market value. If there is no market
value, the value allowed will be the actual cost to the contractor
plus a fair percentage of that cost as profit.51 Where a written contract is attempted but fails for want of following some required
49

Typical is this from Gearing v. United States, (1912) 48 Ct. Cl. 12, 26,
we think he is entitled to recover on quantum meruit the reasonable
value of the work done . . ." Williston and Thompson, "Williston on Con...

tracts," (Rev. ed. 1937) Sec. 1479, ".. restitution of the value of what has been
given must be allowed." G. T. Fogle & Co. v. United States, (C. C. A. 4th,

1943) 135 F. (2d) 117.
5023 Comp. Gen. 477 (1944). New Rawson Corp. v. United States, (D.
Mass., 1943) 55 F. Supp. 291. In Clark v. United States, supra, footnote 11
herein, there would have been recovery against the government for the value
of a steamer even though it had been wholly destroyed, in the event negligence
on the part of the government as bailee for hire had been established.
", . . . if there is a market value for what the plaintiff is requested to
furnish, that value is the measure of the promised price; if there is no market
price, the measure is at least the cost or worth from the plaintiff's standpoint . . ."-Wiliston and Thompson, "Williston on Contracts," (Rev. ed.
1937) Sec. 1480. In Douglas Aircraft Co. v. United States, (1941) 95 Ct. Cl.
140, the amount allowed was the cost to the contractor plus a profit equal to
10% of that cost. If the express contract is good but the price stated in it is not
adequate to the contractor, he cannot for that reason alone recover in quantum
meruit on an implied contract. Frazier Davis Construction Co. v. United
States, (1943) 100 Ct. Cl. 120; 3 Comp. Gen. 51 (1923).
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statutory procedure, the reasonable value will be considered to be
that stated in the written agreement, except where there are facts
to throw suspicion on the price stated. If it is tainted by fraud 52 or
by an effort to monopolize a market temporarily, 53 the stated price
wilf be disregarded; and if the contractor, gives no other evidence
of fair value he will not in such case recover anything.54 In any
event the amount recovered will not exceed the stated price. 5
A case may be conceived of an express contract attempted which
fails for mutual mistake but the failure is discovered only after
performance by the private party. A bid, for example, may consist
of a number of sheets all signed by thebidder who observed only
the price stated on the first sheet and failed to detect a lower price
stated through clerical error on the last sheet. The contracting
officer for the government notices only the low price on the last
sheet, makes an award on that basis, and fails to catch the intended
figure on the first. Prior to performance, either party could avoid
the contract on the ground of mutual mistake. After performance,
the express 'contract still fails for the same reason, but recovery is
allo,wed in implied contract. The contractor's measure of damages
is the reasonable value of the benefit conferred, but not in excess
of the next highest bid that had been filed. 56 In this way the contractor is limited by what the government would have paid for the
item if this contractor had never made a bid.
Later in this article, question will be raised briefly as to any
possible difference in meaning between "quantum meruit" or
"reasonable value" in implied contracts and "just compensation"
under the Fifth Amendment. It is the purpose at this point to
consider how the federal courts have treated certain categories
.of implied in fact contract cases.

Gratuitous Claims Statutes
Not only has Congress waived the immunity of the government
from suit against it in some kinds of tort cases. It has provided
for the administrative investigation or allowance of other kinds of
52

Crocker, Trustee of Postal Service Co. v. United States, (1916) 240
U. S. 74, 36 Sup. Ct. 245, 60 L. Ed. 533. Cf. Muschany v. United States;
(1945) 324 U. S. 49, 65 Sup. Ct. 442, 89 L. Ed. 492.
5314
Comp. Gen. 875 (1935).
54
Crocker, Trustee of Postal Service Co. v. United States, supra, foot-

note 5552.
St. Louis Hay and Grain Co. v. United States, (1903) 191 U. S. 159,

24 Sup. Ct. 47, 48 L. Ed. 130; Gorman v. United States, (1944) 102 Ct. Cl.
260.
56

Shepard v. United States, (1942) 95 Ct. Cl. 407.
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tort claims. For procedural purposes, these claims for administrative determination may be divided into two general categories. In
one, departments of the government may investigate claims arising
out of torts committed by their officers or employees, after which
recommendations are made to the appropriate committee of Congress for further consideration and allowance. In the second
category, the department itself both investigates the claims and
makes final administrative determination and payment of them.
The first category is illustrated by what has been known as
the Negligence Act.5 7 It gives authority to the head of each department or independent establishment of the government to determine
claims not in excess of $1,000 for damage to private property
caused by the negligence of any officer or employee of the department acting within the scope of his employment. The department
certifies such claims to Congress, by practice through the Bureau
of the Budget from which they find their way to the Appropriations
Committee of the House of Representatives, and Congress provides
for final settlement and payment of the claims in a deficiency appropriation statute. While Congress considers larger claims without necessarily a departmental recommendation, the Negligence
Act relieves Congress of having to initiate investigations as to small
claims or of claimants having to appeal to their Congressmen directly concerning them. The statute is of a distinct public relations
value to the various government departments, moreover, by enabling them to contact complaining persons directly and to soothe
troubled waters in the field. Congress still determines the ultimate
liability and controls the procedure for its determination. The
statute covers only claims for privately-owned property and does
not cover personal injuries.
The procedure required by the Negligence Act would still entail
undue burdens upon Congress as to damages and injuries caused
by the great mass of personnel in and accompanying the armed
forces as in World War II. Within the War Department, as an
example, the Negligence Act. was accordingly superseded by
legislation generally administered within the Office of The Judge
Advocate General. The broadest of these as to persons who can
make claims and as to geographical application, often referred to
within the War Department as the Military Claims Act,5 8 authorizes
5742 Stat. 1066 (1922), 31 U. S. C. 215-217.
5857 Stat. 374 (1943), 31 U. S. C. 223b, as amended by sec. 4, act 29
May 1945, Public Law 67-79th Congress. Army Regulation, AR 25-25, 29
May 1945.
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the Secretary of War or his designee to ascertain and pay claims up
to $1,000 in time of war or $500 during other times for damage or
loss of property or for personal injury or death59 caused by military
personnel or civilian employees of the War Department or the Army
acting within the scope of their employment or otherwise incident
to noncombat activities. The Military Claims Act further provides
that the Secretary of War may report such claims as exceed these
amounts to Congress for its consideration. In the event such larger
claims are meritorious and otherwise within the terms of the statute,
the procedure for consideration by Congress is the same as under
the Negligence Act as to claims $1,000 or under arising within
most of the other of the executive departments. Claims not within
the terms of either of these statutes are nevertheless allowed by
private act introduced usually by one of the claimant's Congressmen. Private claims bills are referred to the Committee on Claims
of either the House of Representatives or the Senate as the case may
be. Congress, of course, is not precluded from allowing any claim
'by a private act, whether or not it could be settled by the administrative process, although it seems generally to be a Congressional
preference and sometimes a requirement that claimants resort
first to judicial 6r administrative remedies where they have been
made available.
There are three other War Department provisions available
for the administrative settlement of claims. Where persons subject
to military law do damage to private property by riotous, violent,
or a vis et armis sort of conduct, with a willful disregard probably
greater than the normal concept of gross negligence, the Articles
of War,60 making one of these procedures availabl., provide for
deductions from the salaries of the personnel to pay for the damage.
The Foreign Claims Act,61 the second of these provisions, illustrates with added emphasis that statutes authorizing payment
of claims against the military services are intended to have a public
relations value. It gives authority to both the Secretary of the
Navy and the Secretary of War to pay claims for noncombat
damage to inhabitants of foreign countries where American troops
59
The Act limits payment on account of personal injury or death to
reasonable medical, hospital and burial expenses.
60(AW 105) Stat. 808 (1920), 10 U. S. C. 1577; (AW 89) 41 Stat. 805
(1920), 10 U. S. C. 1561. Language such as that used in the statute calls for
more than gross negligence. Lee v. Latt, (1934) 50 Ga. App. 39, 177 S. E.
92. AR 25-80, 29 May 1945.
6155 Stat. 880 (1942), 57 Stat. 66 (,1943), 31 U. S. C. 224d. AR 25-90,
29 May 1945.
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are stationed. Under the Foreign Claims Act, claims may be administratively determined and paid up to $5,000; it is not necessary
usually that the American personnel have done their damage within
the scope of their employment; and if the inhabitant is a citizen
of an enemy nation, he will be paid. only after he establishes that
he is friendly to the United States. There is, finally, a statute
known as the Military Personnel Claims Act of 194562 which
authorizes the Secretary of War or his designee to pay claims by
military personnel and civilian employees of the War Department
or the Army where personal property has been lost, damaged,
destroyed or abandoned incident to the claimant's service. All of
these statutes6 3 have been treated within the government as providing for the payment of claims on a pure basis of grace or gratuity.
The statutes relating to the military establishment give a wide range
of freedom for even the determination by the administrative process
of exactly what kinds of claims the departments may choose to
allow.
No nation makes any general policy of providing for payment
of claims arising from the direct impact of c 6mbat, other than to
its own personnel. When claims have been pressed by suit against
the United States by persons other than certain categories of
government officers or employees on a theory of contract implied
in fact, the courts have denied relief. 64 The universal position of nations against allowance of such claims is a sufficient circumstance to
establish that the United States has never intended to assume their
liability by implication, even to its own citizens in the absence of
statute expressing a contrary intent. If, in the press of war, the
United States impresses property and employees of its citizens
into use by the military, however, an intention to pay for their use
-2Act of 29 May 1945, Public Law 67-79th Congress. AR 25-100, 29
May 631945.
For a general treatment, see Boyd, "War Department Claims," in 6
Fed. Bar Jour. 434 (1945). Colonel Ralph G. Boyd is Chief of the Claims
Division in the Office of The judge Advocate General of the Army. See also
Stewart, "Claims by and Against the Government," (1945). The Department of the Navy has further specific claims statutes applicable to that Department.
64
Herrera v. United States, (1912) 222 U. S. 558, 32 Sup. Ct. 179, 56
L. Ed. 316; Juragua Iron Co., Ltd. v. United States, (1909) 212 U. S. 297,
29 Sup. Ct. 385, 53 L. Ed. 520; Perrin v. United States, (1870) 12 Wall. 315,
20 L. Ed. 412. Officers and soldiers of an invading hostile army are not subject to the laws of the enemy country or amenable to its tribunals-in the
event the invasion is successful. Dow v. Johnson, (1879) 100 U. S. 158, 25
L. Ed. 632. Enemy are subject to law of nations. Ex parte Quirin, (1942)
317 U. S. 28, 62 Sup. Ct. 11, 87 L. Ed. 12; Ex parte Zimmerman, (C. C. A.
9th, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 442.
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and services will ordinarily be implied rather than an intention to
do a wrongful act. 65
In the case of a noncombat claim of the gratuitous class against
the government where an intention appears in a statute to permit
payment even though it may sound in tort, question may be raised
whether the policy of the statute is a sufficient circumstance to
constitute an intention to be bound in implied contract. When once
established to provide for payment only as a matter of gratuity
and grace, the right to recover by suit in court on the contract theory
has been denied. 66 There would seem tc; be a point in the determination of such claims, however, where an implied contract to
pay the claim can finally be made out, although that point has never
been established under the specific statutes here mentioned. If usual
contract principles canbe-applied, perhaps by analogy to the subject of refunds in connection with overpayments of taxes, a contractual relationship arises when the person having final authority
to settle the claim has approved it for the government and the
claimant has agreed to accept the approved amount. At that point
there has occurred %omething equivalent to an account stated be65
During the Civil War, a statute authorized appropriation of property
by the government in the suppression of the rebellion. Where a railroad was
rightly taken over by the Union forces because it had been employed by the
enemy, subsequent use of it by the Union forces was held not a circumstance
from which a contract to pay for the use could be implied. The situation when
the property was impressed, and not its later use, was important in determining that the transaction was military in character and not contractual.
United States v. Winchester and Potomac Railroad Co., (1896) 163 U. S.
244, 16 Sup. Ct. 993, 41 L. Ed. 145. Where no guilt of aid to the rebellion
attached to the property but it was impressed into the service because of impending public necessity to supress the rebellion, recovery in implied contract
was allowed. United States v. Russell, (1871) 13 Wall. 623, 20 L. Ed. 474.
Kettler v. United States, (1886) 21 Ct. Cl. 175. If there was no reasonable
basis for saying such impending public necessity existed, the officer ordering
control over the property and its owner was subject to personal liability,
Mitchell v. Harmony,, (1851) 13 How. 115, 14 L. Ed. 75. Cf. Korematsu v.
United States, (1944) 323 U. S.214, 65 Sup. Ct. 193, 89 L. Ed. 202. In
United States v. Pacific Railroad, (1887) 120 U. S.227, 7 Sup. Ct. 490, 30
L. Ed. 639, the United States was held not liable for blowing up the railroad's
bridges incident to combat; and the railroad company was held not liable for
subsequent use of buildings erected without its consent on its lands by the
government. As to the rebuilding of the bridges, which the Army wanted the
company to do, General Rosencrans said what it is submitted he should be
expected to have thought had no words passed: "Gentlemen, the question of
liability of the government for repairing damages to this road is one of law
and fact and it is too early to undertake the investigation of that question in
this stirring time .. .Nevertheless, whatever is fair and right I should like
to see
66 done."
Great Western Serum Co. v. United States, (1920) 254 U. S.240, 41
Sup. Ct. 65, 65 L. Ed. 463; Blagge v. Balch, (1896) 162 U. S.439, 16 Sup.
Ct. 853, 40 L. Ed. 1032; Heirs of Emerson v. Hall, (1839) 13 Pet. 409, 10
L. Ed. 223. No cases on this point appear to have arisen under the specific
tort statutes discussed above.

TORT AND IMPLIED CONTRACT LIABILITY

tween private parties. So long as the claimant has received no
notice of the action of the approving authority, however, the latter
can revoke it. The essentials of an account stated have been said
67
to be the knowledge of the parties and their consent to it.
Where as in the case of the Negligence Act, for instance, it
becomes necessary to determine questions of negligence, causation,
or contributory conduct to preclude payment, the government departments, by the very gratuitous nature of the statutes, are not
bound by Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, supra, as to the
law to be applied, whatever it may be. There is a body of federal
tort decisions which developed prior to that case and which the
plaintiff in that case had hoped would be applied. The administrative practice in handling gratuitous tort claims, however, is to
conform customarily to the law of the state where the damage
occurs except where a federal statute or specific government department policy may conflict with the law of the situs. 65 Considered
from a public relations angle, it may be that it is generally offensive,
when federal funds have been made available, for a resident of a
state to be denied relief on a theory of law different from that prevailing in that state. On the other hand, if suit in court would be
67
Daube v. United States, (1933) 289 U. S. 367, 53 Sup. Ct. 597, 77 L.
Ed. 1261; Bonwit Teller & Co. v. United States, (1931) 283 U. S. 258, 51
Sup. Ct. 395, 75 L. Ed. 1018; United States v. Savings Bank, (1881) 104
U. S. 728, 26 L. Ed. 908; United States v. Kaufman, (1877) 96 U. S. 567, 24
L. Ed. 792; Braun v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 176, 46 F. Supp. 993; Midpoint
Realty Co. v. United States, (1941) 95 Ct. Cl. 63, 42 F. Supp. 76. (Refund of
customs duties allowed where illegally collected.) Dooley v. United States,
(1901) 182 U. S. 222, 21 Sup. Ct. 762, 45 L. Ed. 1074. (Drawbacks recovered
by exporters on basis of implied contract) Campbell v. United States, (1882)
107 U. S. 407, 2 Sup. Ct. 759, 27 L. Ed. 592. (Innocent person's money brought
into United States Treasury through frabd of government agent. Sum recov-

ered back in implied contract.) United States v. State Bank, (1877) 96 U. S.
30, 24 L. Ed. 647. (Individual wrongfully in possession of government money
is liable to the government in assumpsit.) Bayne v. United States, (1876)
93 U. S. 642, 23 L. Ed. 997. Where the morals of a transaction are such
that society would expect repayment, it seems that the courts should interpret the circumstances that repayment is intended, rather than a wrongful
appropriation of the sums involved, unless some regulation of the department
forbids repayment. Where a tax was paid twice on the same item, the first
assessment having been illegal, action in the Court of Claims resulted in the
claimant's favor. Bull, Executor v. United States, (1935) 295 U. S. 247, 260,
261, 55 Sup. Ct. 695, 700, 79 L. Ed. 1421, 1427, 1428. But cf. United States v.
Minnesota Investment Co., (1925) 271 U. S. 212, 46 Sup. Ct. 501, 70 L. Ed. 911.
GsThe rule that contributory negligence bars recovery is so firmly intrenched in federal government administrative practice that it will not be
relaxed in a state where doctrines of last clear chance or comparative negligence prevail. The Military Claims Act even specifically provides that no
claim may be allowed under it if the damage, injury or death was caused in
any part by the negligence or wrongful act of the claimant. For public relations purposes, however, the rule of that sort prevailing in the foreign country
where the claim arises is followed under the Foreign Claims Act.
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permitted against the federal government for torts done by its
employees with government-owned machines operated pursuant to
a federal statute, question may be raised whether the same law
ought not to be applied in government tort cases as it seems is
applied in government contract cases. If a federal statute authorizing such suit also specified certain, rules, then clearly they would
prevail over rules usually applied in the state where damage or
injury shall have occurred.
Patents
Congress provided in 1910 that the United States may be sued
in the Court of Claims for patent infringement. 9 Such waiver of
immunity from suit may not be found in the Tucker Act, since infringement cases sound in tort.7 0 The condition for suit under the
patent statute is that the United States use or manufacture a
patented invention without license of the owner.7' Suit.may not
be commenced under it by one who is in the employment of the
United States at the time he makes the claim, or by his assignee.
The statute does not apply to any device discovered or invented
during the employee's service with the government.
Where the use of the patented device by the government is
with the consent of the owner, there is no basis for an infringement
suit, but the owner may still have rights under the Tucker Act on
6936 Stat. 851 (1910), 40 Stat. 705, (1918) 35 U. S. C. Sec. 250. Suit must
be by someone with enough interest in the invention so that under proper facts
he could maintain suit against some infringer other than the United States.
A mere licensee, for instance, to whom no assignment of a share in the patent
has ever been made may not sue under this statute. Bliss Co. v. United States,
(1926) 225 U. S. 187, 32 Sup. Ct. 626, 56 L. Ed. 1047. This 'statute in the
form in which it was originally enacted in 1910 was held not to confer upon
all who contract to perform work for the United States the right to disregard
rights of patentees and use their patents without making compensation. Cramp
& Sons v. Curtis Turbine Co., (1918) 246 U. S. 28, 38 Sup. Ct. 271, 62 L.
Ed. 560. The 1918 amendment was made to protect government contractors
against liability for such infringement where use of the patent was done with
the government's consent. "The purpose of the amendment was to relieve the
contractor entirely from liability of every kind for the infringement of patents
in manufacturing anything for the Government and to limit the owner of the
patent ...

to suit against the United States .. ,"-Taft, C. J., in Richmond

Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, (1928) 275 U. S. 331, 343, 345, 48 Sup.
Ct. 194, 199, 72 L. Ed. 303, 307, 308.
The nature and extent of legal consequences of the expiration of a patent
are matters of-federal law. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., Inc., (1945)
66 Sup.
70 Ct. 101, 90 L. Ed. 88.
Belknap v. Schild, (1896) 161 U. S. 10, 16 Sup. Ct. 443, 40 L. Ed. 599;
Schillinger v. United States, (1894) 155 U. S. 163, 15 Sup. Ct. 85, 39 L.
Ed. 108.
7'The use of the invention must be with the knowledge and consent of
the government. Wood v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., (S. C. Ala., 1924)
296 Fed. 718.
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a theory of contract. 72 In the latter case, even government employees may sue. A statute of 1928 authorizes patent by government employees without charge to them whenever an employee's
department head certifies that the invention is used or liable to be
used in the public interest. In such case, the applicant is obliged
to state that the invention may be used by or for the government
without payment to him of any royalty. Upon such a statement
of intention by him, he would surely be precluded from recovery
on a theory of either contract or infringement should the government later use his invention. Even without the 1928 statute, he
will be treated as estopped from recovering in contract if he invents with government materials and on government time, and
encourages the government to use the invention over a time without
a prompt assertion of his right to compensation.74 By his own conduct, the government may be led to believe the employee does not
expect payment; and that fact negatives as well the intention of the
government to pay, and precludes recovery in implied contract.7 5
On the other hand, the mere fact that one permits another to
use his patented invention or even invites him to do so does not in
itself mean that he does not expect to be paid for its use; and under
proper facts he can recover.7 6 His right thus to recover would
seem more clear in a government case where a public officer, acting
pursuant to statute and acknowledging the right of a patentee,
whether a government employee or otherwise, makes use of the
invention -without the patentee's consent.7 7 There has been an aversion on the part of the federal courts, apparent long prior to the 1910
infringement statute, to holding that the government in using or
72Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, (1912) 224 U. S. 290, 32
Sup. Ct. 488, 56 L. Ed. 771.
7345 Stat. 467 (1928), 35 U. S. C. Sec. 45.
-4Gill v. United States, (1896) 160 U. S. 426,16 Sup. Ct. 322,40 L. Ed. 480.
If the employee invents partly on government time and the invention is unrelated to the government work to which he is assigned, the government is
entitled to use the invention but has no equity to demand a conveyance of the
invention. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., (1933) 289 U. S. 178,
53 Sup. Ct. 554, 77 L. Ed. 1114. The right of the government to the invention
by one of its employees depends upon the nature of the service the employee
is engaged in, and his duty to the government with respect to that service, at
the time the invention is made. Houghton v. United States, (C. C. A.
4th, 1928) 23 F. (2d) 386. See Crown Cork & Seal Co. Inc. v. Fankhanel,
(D. Md.,
1943) 49 F. Supp. 611.
75
Harley v. United States, (1905) 198 U. S. 229, 25 Sup. Ct. 634, 49
L. Ed. 1029.
76United States v. Palmer, (1888) 128 U. S. 262, 9 Sup. Ct. 104, 32
L. Ed.
77 442.
Hollister, Collector v. Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., (1885) 113 U. S.
59, 5 Sup. Ct. 717, 28 L. Ed. 901.
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taking another's property intends to commit a wrong rather than
deal on a contract or purchase and sale basis. Conflicting patent
claims, however, make it difficult for officers in executive departments to know at times whether they are using another's invention
or not. The determination must ultimately be made by the courts
anyway. In questionable cases, it would be natural to expect them
to go ahead and use the device which the government needs, intending that the government will not pay a claimant for its use if
the claimant is not an owner of it but that it will pay if the courts
T
in time should adjudge that he is.
7
The claimant may even cooperate and invite use of the device by the government and still
recover in implied contract, though there be no infringement and
also though the government officer, while not denying claimant's
ownership, 9 asserts himself as dubious about it."'

ii
TAKING UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The language of the Tucker Act lends itself to the possible
interpretation that it is a consent by Congress to suit against the
government for property taken under the Fifth Amendment, simply
as an action founded upon the Constitution, without the necessity
78This position was reflected in the opinion of Mr. Justice Brewer in
United States v. Berden Fire-Arms Mfg. Co., (1895) 156 U. S. 552, 568, 15
Sup. Ct. 420, 425, 39 L. Ed. 530, 535: "The government used the invention
with the consent and express permission of the owner, and it did not, while
so using it, repudiate the title of such owner . . .the attitude of the War
Department towards inventors in ordnance has been one of neutrality; it has
neither denied nor admitted the legal rights, if any there were, of inventors ...
but has proceeded upon the policy that executive officers should not decide
upon such claims against the government or upon conflicting claims, but that
the claim should be presented without prejudice before some other tribunal
than an
executive department."
79 On the other hand, his denial of the claimant's ownership would be
tantamount to expression of intention not to pay. The claimant, if he is in fact
the owner, would not then recover in implied contract under the Tucker Act
but should proceed under the 1910 patent infringement statute. Farnham v.
United
States, (1916) 240 U. S. 537, 36 Sup. Ct. 427, 60 L. Ed. 786.
80
"There is but one question . .. the attitude of the Ordnance Bureau
... toward the Leibert patent, whether in recognition of it . . . or . . . in

tortious use of it ...We have in other cases expressed our aversion to the
latter conclusion except upon explicit declaration or upon a course of proceedings tantamount to it. A contract, express or implied in fact, must, it is
true, be established, but one to pay for a mechanism used will be implied
rather than a tortious appropriation of it . . . Where the government uses

a patented invention 'with the consent and permission of the owner' and does
not 'repudiate the title of such o'vner,' an implied contract to pay a reasonable compensation for such usage arises .. ."-McKenna, J., in United States
v. Bethlehem Steel Co., (1922) 258 U. S.321, 326, 327, 42 Sup. Ct. 334, 336,
66 L. Ed. 639, 641, 642.

TORT AND IMPLIED CONTRACT LIABILITY

of having to work out a contract between the parties. In this
vein, attempt has been made to dissect the Tucker Act into four
categories, that it waives the immunity of the government from
suit against it, except for pensions, as to cases founded (1) upon
the Constitution or federal statute, (2) upon any executive department regulation, (3) upon any government contract, whether express or implied, and (4) for damages in cases not sounding in
tort. By this reading of the Act, recovery should be allowed in
a case founded upon the Constitution whether or not the taking
was tortious.
The statute in its original form, however, did not mention
claims founded upon the Constitution.81 This provision was added
when the Tucker Act was amended in 18 8 7. 82 The concept that recovery in a case of taking without condemnation proceedings must
be based on contract developed prior to this amendment, and the
law as to what constitutes a contract implied in fact had perhaps
been stretched a bit, because of the spirit of the Fifth Amendment,
in an effort to give the claimant compensation where in justice it
was due him. Thus the theory had developed substantially that
the right of recovery arose out of implied contract and not from
the Constitution. 83 After the 1887 amendment, this theory seems
to have been retained in no inconsiderable part and the position
of the Supreme Court to be that the words in the Tucker Act, "not
sounding in tort," related back to all the categories of claims for
which one can sue the government, so that suit could not be brought
under the Tucker Act for a cause based upon the Fifth Amendment
4

if it did sound in tort.8

Ever since the 1887 change in the Tucker Act, there has been
uncertainty on the Supreme Court itself as to whether Fifth Amendment cases can be founded alone upon the Constitution or whether
81R. S. 1059, 10 Stat. 612 (1855), 12 Stat. 765 (1863), 14 Stat. 44 (1866).

8224 Stat. 505 (1887). At this point, the statute became known as the
Tucker Act.
s3See Mills v. United States, (1884) 19 Ct. Cl. 79.
84Basso v. United States, (1916) 239 U. S. 602, 36 Sup. Ct. 226, 60
L. Ed. 462; Hooe v. United States, (1910) 218 U. S. 322, 31 Sup. Ct. 85, 54
L. Ed. 1045; Schilinger v. United States, (1894) 155 U. S. 163, 15 Sup. Ct.
85, 39 L. Ed. 108; United States v. Jones, (1888) 131 U. S. 1, 9 Sup. Ct. 669,
33 L. Ed. 90. But see concurring opinion of Brown, J., in United States
v. Lynah, (1903) 188 U. S. 445, 23 Sup. Ct. 349, 47 L. Ed. 539, overruled on
other grounds in United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific
Rd. Co., (1941) 312 U. S. 592, 313 U. S. 543, 61 Sup. Ct. 772, 85 L. Ed. 1064.
Merriam v. United States, (1894) 29 Ct. Cl. 250. In McArthur v. United
States, (1894) 29 Ct. Cl. 191, claimant was not allowed to waive the tort and
sue in contract where the case actually sounded in tort.
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a contract must be made out between the parties. The Court itself
has divided at times. 85 It has permitted suit to be founded upon the

Constitution in one case,8 6 and, in a succeeding one, proceeded on
a theory of contract.8 7 The more recent cases do not out and out
repudiate the contract requirement, but they do disregard it and
treat only with the constitutional aspects. 88
Imagining what government officers may think when they take
an individual's property away from him is not a particularly
satisfying procedure. In Portsmouth HarborLand & Hotel Co. v.
United States,8 9 Mr. Justice Holmes said that "if the acts amounted
to a taking, without assertion of an adverse right, a contract would
be implied whether it was thought or not." That case involved the
setting up of heavy coast defense guns by the government on land
adjoining the property of the claimant during World War I and
aimed for fire control purposes over his land. He claimed that
thereby his land was subjected to a servitude. The question was
whether the government had done enough so that there was a taking
of an interest in his land. If it tested a gun by firing only a few
times across his property, that would be a temporary invasion in
the nature of a tort. At some point beyond those preliminary shots,
the Court concluded, there would be a taking, in which event an
implied 'contract would be established.
Thereafter, in Jacobs v. United States,9° Chief Justice Hughes
denied entirely the necessity for making out a contract, saying that
,"the claim . . . rested upon the Fifth Amendment.

Statutory

recognition was not necessary. Such a promise was implied because
of the duty imposed by the Amendment."
Though this pronouncement in the Jacobs case may seem the
sound one, it is uncertain as to how far the Supreme Court can
85
United States v. Lynah, supra, footnote 84, for example.
8

6Dooley v. United States, (1901)
1074.
L. Ed.
87

182 U. S. 222, 21 Sup. Ct. 762, 45

Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, (1922) 260
U. S. 327, 43 Sup. Ct. 135, 67 L. Ed. 287; United States v. Great Falls Mfg.
Co., (1884) 112 U. S. 645, 5 Sup. Ct. 306, 28 L. Ed. 846. Suit cannot lie
under the Tucker Act against a privately-owned public utility corporation.
The obligation in case of a taking by such a company was treited as con-

stitutional rather than contractual in Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.,
(1914)
88 233 U.-S. 546, 34 Sup. Ct. 654, 58.L. Ed. 1088.
United States v. Willow River Power Co., (1945) 65 Sup. Ct. 761, 89
L. Ed. 709; United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., (1945) 65 Sup. Ct. 803,
89 L.8 Ed. 722.
sSupra, note 86.
""Jacobs v. United States, (1933) 290 U. S. 13, 16, 54 Sup. Ct. 26, 27,
78 L. Ed. 142, 144. See Stovall v. United States, (1891) 26 Ct. Cl. 226.
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be relied upon to follow it; and the contract theory in eminent domain
cases cannot safely be disregarded. 1 If the government takes by
condemnation proceeding or under a requisition statute, 92 the intention to pay is dear. If it does not take by condemnation or requisition, but admits that the claimant owns the land that is taken
and yet does not deny that it will pay him, the courts presume an
intention to pay rather than a tortious taking. 93 If it floods one's
land without apparently knowing whose it is, as would usually occur
in flooding cases, surely the owner will be paid whoever he may
prove to be. On the other hand, where the government taking is
coupled with an express refusal to pay or a claim that the government and not the claimant owns the property, the taking is tortious
and no recovery for it is allowed.9 4 Where the invasion of the
property was not predictable in advance, no promise by the government to pay can be made out of the surrounding circumstances,
9lSuggesting recovery based on implied agreement: "The implication
that by the appropriation of private property to public use the United States
undertakes to make just compensation for it (Citation of cases) must likewise enter into the construction of a statute giving to a non-enemy a remedy
for the seizure of his property as a war measure."--Stone, J., in Becker Steel
Co. v. Cummings, (1935) 296 U. S. 74, 79, 56 Sup. Ct. 15, 18, 80 L. Ed. 54,
59. "We conclude that the lands were appropriated by the United States in
circumstances which involved an implied undertaking by it to make just compensation to the tribe."--Van Devanter, J., in United States v. Creek Nation,
(1934) 295 U. S. 103, 111, 55 Sup. Ct. 681, 684, 79 L. Ed. 1331, 1336. That
it is based on Constitution: United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in
Prince George's County, (D. Md., 1941) 40 F. Supp. 436. Based on implied
contract: United States v. A Certain Tract in Chatham County, (S. D. Ga.,
1942) 44 F. Supp. 712.
02Requisition is generally treated as a summary taking as distinguished
from condemnation by court or other proceeding. Both are an exercise of
eminent domain and subject to the limitations of the Fifth Amendment.
Fletcher v. Maupin, (C. A., D. C., 1942) 129 F. (2d) 46, 49; Benedict v.
United States, (E. D., N. Y., 1920)' 271 Fed. 714, 719. Note, "American
Economic Mobilization," in 55 Harv. L. Rev. 429, 508-518 (1942). U. S.
Department of Justice, "Expropriation of Property for National Defense,"
(1941) 5. Note in 137 A. L. R. 1290. Mere taking of lands by requisition
pursuant to proclamation of President or Secretary of Labor, as authorized
by statute, transfers title to the government. United States v. McIntosh,
(E. D. Va., 1932) 2 F. Supp. 244, appeal dismissed (C. C. A. 4th, 1934) 70
F. (2d) 507, certiorari denied 293 U. S. 586 (1934) ; United States v. Stein,
(N. D. Ohio, E. D., 1921) 48 F. (2d) 626.
93
United States v. Buffalo Pitts Co., (1914) 234 U. S. 228, 34 Sup. Ct.
840, 58 L. Ed. 1290; Merriam v. United States, (1894) 29 Ct. Cl. 250; Mills
v. United States, (1884) 19 Ct. Cl. 79; Mason v. United States, (1878) 14
Ct. Cl. 59.
94
United States v. North American Transportation and Trading Co.,
(1919) 253 U. S. 330, 40 Sup. Ct. 518, 64 L. Ed. 935; Ball Engineering Co.
v. White & Co., (1918) 250 U. S. 46, 39 Sup. Ct. 393, 63 L. Ed. 835; Hijo v.
United States, (1904) 194 U. S. 315, 24 Sup. Ct. 727, 48 L. Ed. 994. Each of
these cases lends support to the conclusion that whether a taking is tortious
or contractual is determined as of the time of the taking.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

for it could not have known that an invasion was to 'be made.9 5 The
intention of the claimant that he be paid, to establish mutuality, can
be made out in these various cases by the fact of his making a claim
on a contract theory.9 In a sense, he thereby adopts the transaction
as a contract to which he is a party.
While a temporary invasion of the nature heretofore mentioned
has been said to defeat recovery in that it is a tort, a partial taking

is such an invasion as lets the individual into court. Thus a taking
under the Fifth Amendment may be of a piece of the claimant's
*property, or an easement over it, or some leasehold or any other
property interest in it.97- Firing large guns across one's summer
resort property a few times so that his guests leave the disturbance
never to return is a temporary tort invasion. 8 On the other hand,
if the government occupies the same property for a short while
during the winter season when he has no regular guests, that sort
of temporary invasion is a taking of a leasehold interest in the
95

Horstmann Co. v. United'States, (1921)

257 U. S. 138, 42 Sup. Ct. 58,

66 L. Ed. 171. No reason to expect in advance that the flooding would occur,
and not established that the overflow was the "direct or necessary" result of
the government structure. Sanguinnetti v. United States, (1924) 264 U. S.
146, 44 Sup. Ct. 264, 68 L. Ed. 608.
96
Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General, (1888) 124 U. S. 581, 8
Sup. Ct. 631, 31 L. Ed. 527. In Benedict v. United States, (E. D., N. Y.,
1920) 271 Fed. 714, 719, "A requisition is a one-sided exercise of authority,
which depends either upon. force or the acquiescence and loyalty of the owner
of the property requisitioned, in order to accomplish the taking. Whether
protest be entered or not, the obligation to repay is the same." But that
Court, while its conclusion may be sound, can be supported only on the theory
that the right of recovery was not contractual but arose under the particular
requisition statutes involved. Were there no such statute, the Court would
be obliged to say the obligation arose under the Constitution, or change its
conclusion.
9
7United States v. General Motors Corp., (1945) 65 Sup. Ct. 357, 89
L. Ed. 379; Duckett & Co. v. United States, (1924) 266 U. S. 149, 45 Sup.
Ct. 38, 69 L. Ed. 216; United States v. Cress, (1917) 243 U. S. 316, 37 Sup.
Ct. 380, 61 L. Ed. 746; United States v. Welch, (1910) 217 U. S. 333, 30
Sup. Ct. 527, 54 L. Ed. 787; United States v. Dunnington, (1892) 146 U. S.
338, 36 L. Ed.. 996; Karlson v. United States, (C. C. A. 8th, 1936) 82 F.
(2d) 330; National Laboratory & Supply Co. v. United States, (E. D. Pa.,
1921) 275 Fed. 218; Seabloom v. Krier, (Minn.) 18 N. W. (2d) 88 (1945) ;
Petition of Burnquist, (Minn.) 19 N. W. (2d) 394 (1945) ; Mackey v.
Harmon, 34 Minn. 168, 24 N. W. 702 (1885).
9
sPeabody v. United States, (1913) 231 U. S. 530, 34 Sup. Ct. 159, 58
L. Ed. 351. But see by Brandeis, J., in Hurley, Sec. of War v. Kincaid,
the
(1935) 285 U. S. 95, 103, 52 Sup. Ct. 267, 269, 76 L. Ed. 637, 642, "...
mere adoption by Congress of a plan of flood control which involves an intentional, additional, occasional flooding of complainant's land constitutes a
taking of it-as soon as the government begins to carry out the project
authorized." No recovery where owner of land is only put to expense to ward
off consequences of an overflow. Walls v. United States, (1909) 44 Ct. Cl. 482.
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premises; and the court has jurisdiction to entertain his claim in
contract. 9
The importance of distinguishing between the theories for recovery in Fifth Amendment cases is further illustrated when the
government takes property that is mortgaged. Government contracts frequently provide that if the contractor defaults, the government can terminate the contract, take over his machinery and materials, complete the job, and charge the contractor with the cost
in excess of the contract price that it takes to complete the work.
If the government officers know when they take over the machinery
that a third person has a mortgage on some of it, and make no
adverse claim for the government, their taking would open the
government to suit on either theory.100 Suppose the chattel mortgage has been duly filed but the government officers do not know.
They have notice but not knowledge, 01 and an intention to pay
the mortgagee cannot well be made out, unless it could be successfully argued that they should have known and that the rule should
be extended to allow recovery on that basis.10 2 All that will have
occurred is a tort by the government, allowing no recovery under
99Brand Investment Co. v. United States, (1944) 102 Ct. Cl. 40; Alexander v. United States, (1904) 39 Ct. Cl. 383; Seabloom v. Krier, (Minn.1945) 18 N. W. (2d) 88. See hereinafter under discussion of Depreciation
and Moving Expenses.

Taking by government must be for a public use. See Nichols, "The

Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain," 20 B. U. L. Rev.
615 (1940).
10LUnited States v. Buffalo Pitts Co., (1914) 234 U. S. 228, 34 Sup. Ct.
840, 58 L. Ed. 1290. Where government denied claimant's title, "Under these
circumstances, the implication of a contract that the United States would
pay, which must be the basis of its liability under the Fifth Amendment, is
clearly rebutted. The liability of the Government, if any, is in tort, for which
it has not consented to be sued."-Day, J., in Ball Engineering Co. v. White
& Co., (1919) 250 U. S. 46, 57, 39 Sup. Ct. 393, 395, 63 L. Ed. 835, 841.
' 01 The notice provided for in state recording acts should extend to the
federal government as well as to any other person. Even so, the United States
is not without its control over titles of both personal and real property within
the states. "Federal statutes may declare liens in favor of the Government
and establish their priority over subsequent purchasers or lienors irrespective
of state recording acts. (Citation of case.) Or the Government may avail
itself, as any other lienor, of state recording facilities, in which case, while
it has never been denied that it must pay nondiscriminatory fees for their
use, the recording may not be the occasion for taxing the Government's
property."-Jackson, J., in United States v. Allegheny County, (1943) 322
U. S. 174, 183, 64 Sup. Ct. 908, 914, 88 L. Ed. 1209, 1217.
102"When the Government has illegally received money which is the
property of an innocent citizen . . . there arises an implied contract on the
part of the Government to make restitution to the rightful owner .

.

. The

defendant knew at the time, or had reason to know, that Hartzell was serving
a sentence for the fraudulent use of the mail in the collection of money for
the Drake estate."-Kirkendall v. United States, (1940) 90 Ct. Cl. 606,
31 F. Supp. 766.
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the Tucker Act on a contract theory. Under the Jacobs case, supra,
however, it would seem that recovery would be allowed. The individual whose property is thus taken is perhaps not wholly without
remedy in any event, however, for under some facts he can sue the
government officers individually to recover his property which
they have wrongfully in their possession. 10 3
Lines also become difficult -to draw in determining whether a
taking has occurred when limitations are imposed upon the use of
one's property by the government's exercise of the police or some
other power. Distinctions may certainly be felt, however, between
a limitation imposed under such a power upon one's own use of
his own property and a taking by the government for it use. Zoning
ordinances, 10 4 regulations of billboards, 105 prohibition of liquor
'o3 (Detinue) Poindexter v. Greenhow, Treasurer, (1884)
114 U. S. 270,
5 Sup. Ct. 903, 29 L. Ed. 185. (Ejectment) Tindal v. Wesley, (1897) 167
U. S. 204, 17 Sup. Ct. 770, 42 L. Ed. 137; Blondet v. Hadley, (C. C. A. 1st,
1944) 144 F. (2d) 372. The question in each case is essentially whether the
officer acted in excess of his authority or under an authority not validly conferred. If the state is an indispensible party, the court will refuse to take
jurisdiction against the officer. Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, Sec. of War.

(1912) 223 U. S. 605, 32 Sup. Ct. 340, 56 L. Ed. 570; The Paquette Habana,
(1903) 189 U. S. 453, 23 Sup. Ct. 593, 47 L. Ed. 900; American School of
Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, (1902) 189 U. S. 94, 23 Sup. Ct. 33, 47 L.
Ed. 90; Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad Co., (1893) 147 U. S. 165,
13 Sup. Ct. 271, 37 L. Ed. 123; Stanley v. Schwalby, (1893) 147 U. S. 508,
13 Sup. Ct. 418, 37 L. Ed. 259; Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick Railroad Co., (1883) 109 U. S. 446, 3 Sup. Ct. 292, 609, 27 L. Ed. 992; Kaufman
v. Lee, (1882) 106 U. S. 196, 1 Sup. Ct. 240, 27 L. Ed. 171; Nelson v. McKenzie-Hague Co. (1934) 192 Minn. 180, 256 N. W. 96, 97 A. L. R. 196. On
immunity of a government contractor from liability, see note in 19 Minn.
L. Rev. 129 (1934). Wrongful act of officer not a taking by the government. Hughes v. United States, (1913) 230 U. S. 24, 33 Sup. Ct. 1019, 57
L. Ed. 1374. Wrongful conduct by troops; then no recovery in suit against
government, Lamar, Executor v. Browne, (1895) 92 U. S. 187, 23 L. Ed. 650;
Garber v. United States, (1911) 46 Ct. Cl. 503; but recovery may be had
under0 Army claims statutes discussed supra under Gratuitous Claims Statutes.
' 4State statute limiting heights of buildings- held valid. Welch v. Swasey,
(1909) 214 U. S. 91, 29 Sup. Ct. 567, 53 L. Ed. 923. Also property setback rules. State v.'Houghton, (1927) 171 Minn. 231, 213 N. W. 907. Zoning
regulations are not contracts. When a residence district develops on basis
of a zoning, Congress is free to modify it later to the detriment of surrounding property values. Reichelderfer v. Quinn, (1932) 287 U. S. 315, 53 Sup.
Ct. 177, 77 L. Ed. 331. Forbidding enlargement of factory in zoned district,
American Wood Products Co. v. Minneapolis, (D. Minn. 4th, 1927) 21 F.

(2d) 440.

Held invalid: Village of Tonka Bay zoning ordinance insofar as it
prevented use of strip of shore land for business of renting boats; violation
of Fourteenth Amendment, Dennis v. Village of Tonka Bay, (C. C. A. 8th,
1945) 151 F. (2d) 411. To prohibit erection of store within a residential
district; improper exercise of police power and a taking without just compensation, State ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton, (1916) 134 Minn. 226, 158
N. W.5 1017.
1o St. Louis Post Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, (1919) 249 U. S. 269,
39 Sup. Ct. 274, 63 L. Ed. 599..
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sales as a war power measure,100 requirements of certain safety
08
7
precautions for the protection of workers," rent controls,' all9
10
are typical police and war power impositions by the government.
Controls of this sort are increasing, and many of them are here
to stay. There is no adequate basis in American constitutional history to say, however, that even the need for the individual's property
by the government in the interest of war, safety, health, morals or
general welfare, will justify its actually taking the property without
paying for it. 10° Any taking under the laws of war in international
law raises a different category of question.
'106Hamilton, Collector v. Kentucky Distilleries, (1919) 251 U. S. 146,

40 Sup. Ct. 106, 64 L. Ed. 194. The War-Time Prohibition Act had been
passed after the armistice of World War I. The war power, said Mr. Justice
Brandeis, "is not limited to victories in the field and the dispersion of the
[insurgent] forces. It carries with it inherently the power to guard against
the immediate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy the evils which have
arisen07from its rise and progress."
1 Plymouth Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, (1914) 232 U. S. 531, 34 Sup.
Ct. 359,
58 L. Ed. 713.
' 0 3Bowles, Administrator v. Willingham, (1944) 321 U. S. 503, 64 Sup.

Ct. 641, 88 L. Ed. 892; Taylor v. Brown, Price Administrator, (United States
Emergency Court of Appeals, 1943) 137 F. (2d) 654, certiorari denied,
(1943) 320 U. S. 787, 64 Sup. Ct. 194, 88 L. Ed. 473. Block v. Hirsh, (1921)

256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. Ed. 865.

109Other property invasions held not a taking: Mortgage moratorium
statute, Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, (1934) 290 U. S.
398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231, 78 L. Ed. 413; statute requiring removal of certain
fire hazards, Perley v. North Carolina, (1919) 249 U. S. 510, 39 Sup. Ct.
357, 63 L. Ed. 735; condemnation by government of right of way over tracks
and then obliging railroad at its own expense to maintain flagmen or take

other safety precautions, Chicago, B & Q Railroad Co. v. Chicago, (1897)

166 U. S. 226, 17 Sup. Ct. 581, 41 L. Ed. 979; statute allowing interested

person the right of access to any mine for purposes of inspection or survey,
which was treated as a temporary interruption as distinguished from a taking,

Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining and Milling Co., (1894) 152 U. S. 160, 14
Sup. Ct. 506, 38 L. Ed. 398; blowing up building to stop spread of fire, Bowditch v. Boston, (1879) 101 U. S. 16, 25 L. Ed. 980; requirement of old-age
assistance liens, Dimke v. Finke, Director of Social Welfare, (1940) 209
Minn. 29, 295 N. V. 75; requiring railroad to build a bridge over its tracks
for use of public including street railway, St. Paul v. Great Northern Railway Co., (1917) 138 Minn. 25, 163 N. W. 788.
Among other non-compensable property invasions are taxation, and the
taking of booty during war in accord with international law. Reasonable
laws for the general welfare cannot be headed off by making contracts
reaching into the future. Dillingham v. McLaughlin, (1924) 264 U. S. 370,
44 Sup. Ct. 363, 68 L. Ed. 742.
Held bad as a taking: Ditch past plaintiff's premises in order to straighten
a creek but making access to his premises difficult, Nalon v. Sioux City,
(1933) 216 Ia. 1041, 250 N. V. 166; regulatory abuse in rate-making, State
v. Tri-State Telephone & Telegraph Co., (1939) 204 Minn. .516, 284 N. W.
294; arbitrary and excessive assessment, in re Mississippi River Boulevard,

(1926) 169 Minn. 231, 211 N. W. 9.

110"... while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. It may be doubted how far
exceptional cases, like the blowing up of a house to stop a conflagration, goand if they go beyond the general rule, whether they do not stand as much
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. When regulation becomes a taking is a matter of degree. This is
illustrated in the case of a taking by the government for its war
needs of materials which the owner is under contract to deliver to
another. A, for instance, has contracted during wartime to buy
from B a quantity of steel at a low price. Before delivery can take
place, B's entire production of steel is requisitioned by the government for war purposes, and the government forbids B to comply
with the terms of its contract with A. There is a frustration of
performance on the contract but no taking from A, and he has no
rights under the Tucker Act.11 The facts can be varied, however,
to show that the contract was to, build a ship for A, who was to
supply the steel to be used in it. With the ship partially completed,
the United States requisitions the hull and all materials necessary
for its completion, orders B to complete it according to the requirements of the contract, and agrees to pay B on the basis of the
contract and reimburse A for payment he has already made on
account. A can insist upon more. It was held in Brooks-Scanlon
Corporationv. United States 112 that he was entitled to the value of
the contract at the time of the taking. His compensation was not
determinable by the legal title to materials during construction, but
by the fact that the government had assumed responsibilities under
the contract and had demanded its benefits as effectively as if A
had voluntarily assigned the contract to it.
Just Compensation
The Supreme Court in the Brooks-Scanlon case, repeated a
general rule it has stated on various occasions, that just compensaupon tradition as upon principle . . . But the question at bottom is upon
whom the loss of the changes desired should fall."-Holmes, J., in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, (1922) 260 U. S. 393, 415, 43 Sup. Ct. 158, 160, 67
L. Ed. 322, 326.
"1Omnia Commercial Co. Inc. v. United States, (1922) 261 U. S. 502, 43
Sup. Ct. 437, 67 L. Ed. 773, discussed in note on "American Economic Mobilization," 55 Harv. L. Rev. 429, 465 (1942). Mullen Benevolent Corp. v
United States, (1933) 290 U. S. 89, 54 Sup. Ct. 38, 78 L. Ed. 192.
112(1923) 265 U. S. 106, 44 Sup. Ct. 471, 68 L. Ed. 934. To like effect,
Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, (1897) 166 U. S. 685, 17 Sup.
Ct. 718, 41 L. Ed. 1165; Monongehela Navigation Co. v. United States, (1892)
148 U. S. 312, 13 Sup. Ct. 622, 37 L. Ed. 463. Claimant contracted with
various persons to construct steam turbines for them. Government requisitioned all the contracts during World War I, and told claimant he would be
paid just compensation. After the armistice, government cancelled the con-tracts. Held, claimant could not recover anticipated profits on the entire
transaction as part of just compensation. The Court clearly based compensation on what the government received rather than on what it took from
claimant. The Solicitor General had filed his personal statement advising the
Court that he felt claimant should be able to recover profits on the requisitioned contracts the same as if they had been made directly with the government. DeLaval Steam Turbine Co. v. United States, (1931) 284 U. S. 61,
52 Sup. Ct. 78, 76 L. Ed. 168.
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tion under the Fifth Amendment is a sum which will put the
claimant "in as good a position pecuniarily as it would have been
in if its property had not been taken." 113 Necessarily this rule must
preclude recovery for remote inconvenience and damage. One's
farm may be taken and a fair price paid for it, for example, but
he will not recover for such remote losses as that he cannot buy
another farm in the vicinity as productive as his was. This loss is
not to be shifted to the government, according to another theory,
because it is consequential and the Court has long asserted the
further rule that consequential damages are not compensable. 114 By
this is meant that recovery may be had only if the invasion by the
government is a direct one upon the property. The rule as to
consequential damages, easy to quote and therefore to become fixed
in the law without adequate reason, was carried over from the
earlier simple economic life of the country into the present complex
one with a position generally taken that such damages, whether
proximate or remote, are not to be allowed.
Instead of simply taking one's farm when it takes real estate,
the government is far more likely today than heretofore to render a
public utility ineffective, destroy the good will of a business, ruin
residential districts, throw employees out of jobs, or put the
claimant to additional expenses which are proximate enough but
which nevertheless are consequential."" If the usual rule of dam1The measure of compensation, as stated by the Court, bears analogy

to tort damage and is the loss caused to the claimant by the taking and not

what the taker gains. Campbell v. United States, (1924) 266 U. S. 368, 45
Sup. Ct. 115, 69 L. Ed. 328; United States v. New River Collieries Co.,
(1923) 262 U. S. 341, 43 Sup. Ct. 565, 67 L. Ed. 1014; The Minnesota Rate
Cases, (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511; Bauman v.
Ross, (1897) 167 U. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct. 966, 42 L. Ed. 270; Monongehela
Navigation Co. v. United States, supra, footnote 112.
On just compensation in general, Orgel on Valuation under Eminent
Domain (1936).
On compensation with relation to commandeering of industrial plants,
note, 4"Mobilization for Defense," 50 Yale L. Jour. 250, 274-279 (1940).
" Where the shoe is on the other foot and the land of the claimant is
benefited by a project, the land owner will be paid less for what is taken
because of such benefits. Black, J., United States v. Sponenbarger, (1939)
308 U. S. 256, 266, 60 Sup. Ct. 225, 229, 84 L. Ed. 230, 238. In the case of a
taking by a railroad, see meaning of special benefits, by Jaggard, J., in Mantorville Ry. & Transfer Co. v. Slingerland, (1907) 101 Minn. 488, 494, 112
N. W. 1033, 1036, "They must be special, as distinguished from common
...; actual as distinguished from constructive... ; substantial as distinguished
from speculative . . .; direct as distinguished from consequential . . .; and
proximate, as distinguished from remote .... "
115Statutes, therefore, occasionally provide compensation for damage as
well as taking. The tendency of the Supreme Court has been to say that the
language of the Tucker Act still will not permit of suit for consequential
damages. "If the business was destroyed, the destruction was an unintended
incident of the taking of the land. There can be no recovery under the Tucker
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ages in implied contract cases were to be pursued in cases under
the Fifth Amendment, that payment may be only for the benefit
conferred upon the government, in most cases all the government
would pay for would be the physical property it takes. However,
by the broader rule of the Supreme Court that the claimant should
be put into a semblance of the position he would have been in
pecuniarily hiad his property not been taken, just compensation
must be treated as meaning more than quantum meruit if that is
limited to the reasonable value of the benefit conferred upon the
government. There is no inconsistency between the extension of
benefits for the public good and the moral concept that payment
should be made for the property imposed upon much the-same as
if a voluntary transaction were involved.
The Court recognizes that fair compensation is a matter of
some degree of guesswork. It attempts to adopt some arbitrary
rules for guidance, 16 but no reason is perceived why the equities
of particular cases might not warrant some differences in the
application of the rules. Normally, the compensation attempted
is the fair market value, 117 "what a purchaser in fair market
conditions would have given." If it is land that is involved, and a
parcel has been treated as a unit, that fact is considered in determining compensation for the taking of a part or all of it. The
Court permits consideration, in determining compensation for a
part of the single parcel, of the effect upon the value of the entire
remaining portion: However, if the claimant has other separate
tracts adjoining that which is taken, the effect of the partial taking

-

Act if the intention to take is lacking. (Citation of case.) Moreover, the Act
did not confer authority to take a business."--Brandeis, J., in Mitchell v.
United States, (1925) 267 U. S. 341, 345, 45 Sup. Ct. 293, 294, 69 L. Ed. 644,
648. (Consequential damages recognized), Ettor v. Tacoma, (1913) 288 U. S.
148, 33 Sup. Ct. 428, 57 L. Ed. 773. Statute provided specifically for consequential damages, moving machinery to a new location and setting it up
there, cost of additional police protection in consequence of carrying on construction work, and limited damages for loss of employment due to the taking
of the establishment. Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, (1923) 262 U. S. 668,
43 Sup. Ct. 684, 67 L. Ed. 1167. U. S. ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority
v. Indian Creek Marble Co., (E. D. Tenn., 1941) 40 F. Supp. 811; Carr v.
United States, (W. D. Ky., 1939) 28 F. Supp. 236.
Marcus, "The Taking and Destruction of Property Under a Defense
and War
Program," 27 Cornell L. Quar. 317, 476 (1942).
"16 Discussion by Mr. Justice Roberts in United States v. Miller, (1943)
317 U. S. 369, 63 Sup. Ct. 276, 87 L. Ed. 336.
McCormick, "The Measure of Compensation in Eminent Domain," 17
Minn. L., Rev. 461 (1933).
"17Even though less than claimant had paid for item originally. Olson v.
United States, (1934) 292 U. S. 246, 54 Sup. Ct. 704, 78 L. Ed. 1236; Vogelstein
& Co. Inc. v. United States, (1923) 262 U. S. 337, 43 Sup. Ct. 564, 67 L.
Ed. 1012.
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on those tracts is treated as consequential and hence not compensable. 11 The taking of one tract of land may increase or decrease the market value of neighboring lands in the light of their
proximity to the public improvement on the land taken. If the
government subsequently determines to take these neighboring
lands, it will take them at their value at the time of such taking, provided the neighboring lands were not included within the ultimate
project from the beginning. If they were, the owner of the neighboring lands will not be paid an increased value any more than the
owner whose land was first taken may now recover on that basis." 9
It has been said that all factors going to make up market value
may be considered. Any probable future use of the premises is
admissible in evidence, but it is bad, as being too remote and speculative, to consider possible future uses that are not probable to
occur.' 20 A gravel pit, or a valuable spring, may be considered as
enhancing the value of the land.12' It is proper to consider the
revenue from dairying and farming upon it.122 Where the land has
no market value, the amount of rent, or of income the land has produced and can produce, and the opinions of men who have had experience in dealing in it and are reputed to have knowledge of its
value are competent in determining what the property is worth to
" 81sCampbell v. United States, (1924) 266 U. S. 368, 45 Sup. Ct. 115,
69 L. Ed. 328; Sharp v. United States, (1903) 191 U. S. 341, 24 Sup. Ct.
114, 48 L. Ed. 211; Hoeft v. Iowa, (1936) 221 Ia. 694, 266 N. W. 571; Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary District v. Fitzpatrick, (1937) 201 Minn. 442, 277
N. W. 394. Damage to well on adjoining property is a taking, United States
v. Alexander, (1893) 148 U. S. 186, 13 Sup. Ct. 529, 37 L. Ed. 415.
"19United States v. Miller, supra, footnote 116. The rule has had a
varied application, Willink, Executrix v. United States, (1915) 240 U. S.572,
36 Sup. Ct. 422, 60 L. Ed. 808; New York v. Sage, (1915) 239 U. S. 57,
36 Sup. Ct. 25, 60 L. Ed. 143; Baunman v. Ross, (1897) 167 U. S. 548, 17
Sup. Ct. 966, 42 L. Ed. 270; Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General, (1888)
124 U. S.581, 8 Sup. Ct. 631, 31 L. Ed. 527.
120". . . as a general thing, we should say that the compensation to the
owner is to be estimated by reference to the uses for which the property is
suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants of the community,
or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate future."-Field, J.,
in Boom Co. v. Patterson, (1878) 98 U. S.403,408, 25 L. Ed. 206, 208. Monongehela Navigation Co. v. United States, (1892) 148 U. S.312, 13 Sup. Ct.
622,37 L. Ed. 463; Cameron Development Co. Inc. v. United States, (C. C. A.
5th, 1944) 145 F. (2d) 209; Russell v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., (1885)
33 Minn. 210, 22 N. W. 379. Past pfofits and probable future profits treated
as too conjectural, United States v. Meyer, (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) 113 F. (2d)
387. Agreed sale prices in stressful times held not necessarily a measure,
McNeil & Sons Co. Inc. v. United States, (E. D. Pa., 1924) 1 F. (2d) 39.
l21State v. Horman, (1933) 188 Minn. 252, 247 N. W. 4; City of Ely
v. Conan, (1903) 91 Minn. 127, 97 N. W. 737; Cameron v. Chicago, M. &
St. Paul Railway Co., (1892) 51 Minn. 153, 53 N. W. 199.
22United States v. 2,877.37 Acres of Land, (S. D. Tex., 1943) 52 F.
Supp. 696.
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the owner.123 Evidence of strategic value is bad, however. The
owner of the land may not show. that the government just had to
-have this particular parcel and recover more because of that.124 As
to whether evidence may be introduced of sales of other property
similarly located, the states appear to have applied three different
rules. One is that it is good evidence; another, that it is entirely
inadmissible if there is a market value for the property and except
on cross examination to test expertness; and a third, that it is
discretionary with-the .trial court to receive it. 25 The federal law is
followed, however, in determining just compensation under the Constitution, and federal courts have stated that it is within the discretion of the trial court to receive evidence of'such sales. 26 Whereas some states hold that evidence only of general selling price and
,not of particular sales may be admissible in determining market
value in eminent domain cases, the stated federal rule is that evidence of a recent-sale is admissible as bearing on how to put the
owner into as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not
12 7
been taken.
' 23 Northern Pacific*Ry. Co. v. North American Telegraph Co., (C. C. A.
8th, 1915) 230 Fed. 347. Where the claimant was a township from whom the
United"States took a road by flooding it in the raising of the water level of Lake
of the Woods, the damages were the cost of building another road. United

States v. Wheeler Township, (C. C. A. 8th, 1933) 66 F. (2d) 977. How to
prove prevailing market price. United States v. New River Collieries Co.,
(1923)24 262 U. S.341, 43"Sup. Ct. 565, 67 L. Ed. 1014.
1 United States v... Chandler-Dunbar Co., (1913) 229 U. S. 53, 33 Sup.
Ct. 667, 57 L. Ed. 1063; Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary District v. Fitzpatrick,

(1937) 201 Minn. 442, 277 :N. W. 394; Application of Union Depot Street
Railway & Transfer Co., (1883) 31 Minn. 297, 17 N. W. 626.
25SCases cited in II Wigmore on Evidence (Third Ed., 1940), Secs. 444,
463 and 464. Wigmore suggests that the practical way of meeting the problem
is to allow the trial court in its discretion to exclude such evidence when
it inv6lves a confusion of issues, but that otherwise it should be able to receive
the evidence. Contra, Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary District v. Fitzpatrick,
(1937) 201 Minn. 442, 277 N. W. 394. Note in 14 Col. L. Rev. 171 (1914);

Loring, "An Unsettled Point of Evidence," 5 Harv. L. Rev. 232 (1891).
126Jones v. United States, (1922) 258 U. S.40, 42 Sup. Ct. 218, 66 L. Ed.
'453; Kerr v. South Park Commissioners, (1886) 117 U. S.379, 6 Sup. Ct.
801, 29
L. Ed. 924.
't2 Pennsylvania rule, for instance, is that court shall consider, not particular sales, but only the general selling price in determining market value,

Henkel v. Wabash Pittsburgh Terminal R. R. Co., (1920) 213 Pa. 485, 62
Atl. 1085; Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance on Lives v. Philadelphia, (1920)
268 P. 559, 112 Atl. 76. Federal Rule. United States v. Certain Parcels of
Land in Philadelphia, (C. C. A. 3rd, 1944) 144 F. (2d) 626. Not proper to
admit evidence of offers received since they can be fabricated too easily,
Sharp v. United States, (1903) 191 U. S.341, 24 Sup. Ct. 114, 48 L. Ed. 211.
Resolution of corporation authorized sale to government for $65,000. Government later condemned, and evidence of the resolution was received over the
corporation's objections. Hanson Lumber Co. Ltd. v. United States, (1923)

261 U. S.581, 43 Sup. Ct. 442, 67 L. Ed. 80: Same effect, Wachovia Bank

& Trust Co. v. United States, (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 609; White
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The claimant is entitled to compensation from the time the gov-

ernment takes his property. Interest is allowed from that time, although sometimes it is considered as being interest in an unusual
sense. It is treated much as an equivalent for the use of the property
by the government until payment is actually made.1 2 8 Mere commencement of a condemnation proceeding is not a taking of the property even though it may make it impossible to sell or improve the
property so long as the proceeding is in process. 2 9 If such a proOak Coal Co. v. United States, (C. C. A. 4th, 1926) 15 F. (2d) 474. See
note in 137 A. L. R. 1290, 1295. Amount of insurance placed on building
does not furnish direct evidence of value, but can be brought out in cross-

examination for impeachment purposes. Maxwell v. Iowa State Highway
Commission, (1937) 223 Ia. 159, 271 N. W. 883. Where options on lands

had possibly been obtained by fraudulent representations, and at least were
obtained as compromise under threat of condemnation, they are not now ad-

missible in the condemnation proceeding. Central Nebraska Public Power
& Irrigation District v. Harrison, (C. C. A. 8th, 1942) 127 F. (2d) 588.
Returns for assessment purposes are admissions of value. Minneapolis-St.
Paul Sanitary District v. Fitzpatrick, supra, footnote 125.
12s,,... the taking in a condemnation suit under this statute takes _lace
upon the payment of the money award .... No interest isdue upon the
award. Until taking, condemnor may discontinue or abandon his effort ....
Condemnation is a means by which the sovereign may find out what any
piece of property will cost."-Reed, J., in Danforth v. United States, (1939)
308 U. S.271, 284, 60 Sup. Ct. 231, 236, 84 L. Ed. 240, 246. Taking may
occur at different times from statute to statute, according to its language.
(Declaration of Taking Act) United States v. 17,280 Acres (D. Neb., 1944)
57 F. Supp. 745. No right to payment or interest until taking occurs, Yearsley v. Ross Construction Co, (1940) 309 U. S.18, 60 Sup. Ct. 413, 84 L. Ed.
554. See Jacobs v. United States, (1933) 290 U. S. 13, 54 Sup. Ct. 26, 78
L. Ed. 142; Brown v. United States, (1923) 263 U. S.78, 44 Sup. Ct. 92, 68
L. Ed. 171 ; Bauman v. Ross, (1897) 167 U. S.548, 17 Sup. Ct. 966, 42 L. Ed.
270; Roberts v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co., (1894) 158 U. S. 1, 15 Sup.
Ct. 756, 39 L. Ed. 873; (Shoemaker v. United States, (1893) 147 U. S.282, 13
Sup. Ct. 361, 37 L. Ed. 170;) United States v. Johns, (C. C. A. 9th, 1944) 146
F. (2d) 92; United States v. Certain Land in St. Louis, (E. D. Mo., E. D.
1941) 41 F. Supp. 809; United States v. Rogers, (C. C. A. 8th, 1919) 257
Fed. 397; A. Gettleman Brewing Co. v. Milwaukee, (1944) 245 Wis. 9, 13
N. W. (2d) 541. In United States district court under the Tucker Act, interest
is not allowable on a $10,000 judgment, United States v. Salmon, (C. C. A. 5th,
1930) 42 F. (2d) 353.
12Determination of an award incondemnation likened to an offer subject to acceptance by the government. The judgment is conditional only.
Moody v. Wickard, Sec. of Agriculture (United States, Intervenor), (U. S.
Ct. of App., D. C., 1943) 136 F. (2d) 801. The proceeding is legislative, an
extension of the legislative power, quasi judicial, State v. May, (1939) 204
'Minn. 564, 285 N. W. 834. It is not a civil action within the meaning of the
Minnesota Constitution. State v. Rapp, (1888) 39 Minn. 65, 38 N. W. 926.
The petitioner in such proceeding in Minnesota is treated as the defendant,
and the condemnee as plaintiff with the right to open and close and having
the burden of proof. Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary District v. Fitzpatrick,
supra, footnote 125. Intervention by interested persons allowed. State ex rel
Peterson v. Bentley, (1943) 216 Minn. 146, 12 N. W. (2d) 347. While jury
trials are customary in other courts in establishing value, the Court of Claims
is a legislative court, and not constitutional, so that Congress, despite the
Seventh Amendment, properly dispensed with jury trial in suits brought in
that Court. United States v. Sherwood, (1941) 312 U. S. 584, 61 Sup. Ct.
767, 85 L. Ed. 1058.
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ceeding is commenced and later stopped, the damage, if any, sounds
in tort, and suit will not lie against the federal government for it.
Moreover, the federal courts have treated such damage as merely
consequential. 30 If the proceeding is commenced by a publiclyowned corporation which may be sued in tort, commencement of
the proceeding and then the dropping of it has been held not to be
malicious prosecution,1 3 ' except that recovery has been allowed
where the delay in dismissing the proceeding has been wrongful
or unnecessary.132
"Taken, Destroyed or Damaged" under State Constitutions
The states have been slow to lay themselves open to suit on obligations they ought to pay, although courts have said they are presumed to intend to pay what they owe.133 On the other hand, some
of them have well exceeded the federal government in adopting
basic fair principles for protection to the individual upon whose
property they have imposed. It has been held that the same
eminent domain principles which underlie the Fifth Amendment
as to the federal government apply to the state governments
under

the

Fourteenth

Amendment.134

In

addition,

states

' 33 oSchoolman- v.

United States, (1936) 83 Ct. Cl. 410.
1 'Barmel v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary District, (1938) 201 Minn.
622, 277 N. W. 208, indicating that malicious prosecution arises only by reason of a criminal prosecution or a civil action, and a condemnation proceeding
is neither.
' 32Not necessarily based on malicious prosecution. Simpson v. Kansa.
City, (1892) 111 Mo. 237, 20 S.W. 38.

Proceedings begun, road established, damages awarded, no appeal, but

no physical appropriation by county. Held, a taking at this stage. State v.
Erskine,
33 (1925) 165 Minn. 203, 206 N. W. 447.

' Pound, "A Survey of Public Interests," 58 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 918920 (1945).
(State's intention to pay) State v. Nelson, (1933) 189 Minn. 87, 90,
248 N. W. 751, 752. (Suability in general) Dunnell, Minnesota Digest,
Second Edition, 1928, Sec. 8831. State intervention in suit against Commissioner of Highways to void certain highway projects subjects state to jurisdiction

of court to require state to pay plaintiff, out of funds recovered and saved to
the state, for reasonable and necessary expenditures and attorney fees for
conduct of litigation. Regan v. Babcock, Commissioner of Highways (State,
Intervenor), (1936) 196 Minn. 243, 264 N. W. 803. Injunction and mandamus
lie against public officials, except that court will not control exercise of discretion. Cooke v. Iverson, (1909) 108 Minn. 388, 122 N. W. 251, 52 L. R. A.

(N. S.) 415. Local governments may not tax state lands or proceed against
them. In re Delinquent Real Estate Proceedings, (1931) 182 Minn. 437,
234 N. W. 691. Minnesota has waived immunity from suit for damages
caused by highway location and construction. Laws- of Minnesota 1939, c.
420, Sec.
1. Westerson v. State, (1940) 207 Minn. 412, 291 N. W. 900.
' 34Bowles, Administrator v. Willingham, (1944) 321 U. S.503, 518, 64
Sup. Ct. 641, 649, 88 L. Ed. 892, 905; Hamilton, Collector v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., (1919) 251 U. S.146, 155, 156, 40 Sup. Ct. 106,
107, 108, 64 L. Ed. 194. The obligation of the state is not less than "just corn-
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generally have written eminent domain provisions into their
own constitutions. While the federal courts have shown tendency
to squeeze the protection to the individual by their restrictive application of the rule not allowing consequential damages, the states
have sensed the injustice. A large number of them have amended
their constitutions so as to guarantee payment in the event of the
taking, destruction or damaging of property.135 Most of these
amendments were adopted since 1900. However, a number of them
specify that payment shall be in advance of taking. If consequential
damages are too conjectural or speculative before a taking or
damaging occurs, they may become quite real and definite after
the occurrence. In addition to that, states have fortified protection
to the individual by further statutory provisions. 36
Even under such broad constitutional measures, courts have
not been without tendency to say that the word "damaged" in
state constitutions means little more than "taken" in the Constitution of the United States,' 37 and that in any event it does not
cover damages that are consequential. 3 8 The state provisions, however, clearly show an effort to provide for more than the federal
Constitution has been interpreted as providing. Otherwise, there
would have been no purpose in making the amendments. The
states' interpretations of their own constitutions surely will conpensation" under the federal Constitution. United States v. Miller, spra,
footnote 116. A municipality may not invoke the Fourteenth Amendment
against the state as to property held for governmental purposes, for a municipality is simply a political subdivision of the state, Trenton v. New
Jersey, (1923) 262 U. S. 182, 43 Sup. Ct. 534, 67 L. Ed. 937; Hunter v. Pittsburgh, (1907) 207 U. S.161, 28 Sup. Ct. 40, 52 L. Ed. 151. The Minneapolis
park board properly transferred the Minneapolis municipal airport to the
state without compensation. Monaghan v. Armatage et al (Minneapolis-St.
Paul Metropolitan Airports Commission, Intervener), (1944) 218 Minn.
108, 15
N. W. (2d) 241.
'3-For instance, Constitution of the State of Minnesota, Article 1, Sec. 13,

as, amended November 3, 1896: "Private property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public usep without just compensation first paid or
secured." Note that, contrary to the Constitution of the United States, this

provision
states that compensation or security must precede the taking.
' 36For instance, "The word 'taking' and all words and phrases of like
import include every interference, under the right of eminent domain, with

the ownership, possession, enjoyment, or value of private property."--Minn.
St. 1941, Sec. 117.02, subd. 2 (Mason St. 1927, Sec. 6538).
133"The rule prescribed by the Minnesota constitution is not, at least
so far as concerns these cases, to be distinguished from that expressed by the
just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment and implied in the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution."

-Butler, J., in Olson v. United States, (1933) 292 U. S.246, 254, 54 Sup. Ct.
704, 708, 78 L. Ed. 1236, 1244. Orgel on Valuation under Eminent Domain

(1936) Sec. 77.
'3sTransportation Co. v. Chicago, (1878) 99 U. S.635, 25 L. Ed. 336.
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trol so long as the states guarantee at least as much compensation
as the United States, Constitution requires to be paid. In Minnesota, as an example, the inclination is to treat eminent domain impositions as tortious rather than contractual. 39 States are now
in fact paying consequential damages under at least some guise in
the taking, destruction or damaging of private property. 4 0 Prior
to any such amendment, most states, for instance, disallowed
claims by property owners where a change in grade of a road in
front of their homes would spoil their property. 14' Under such
amendments, however, claims for such damage are allowed. 42 The
139 Minn. St. 1941, Sec. 561.03 (Mason St. 1927, Sec. 9582). Greenwood v.
Evergeen Mines Co., (1945) (Minn.), 19 N. W. (2d) 726. Note language
of Loring, J., in dissent in State v. Stanley, (1933) 188 Minn. 390, 247 N. W.
509.
14OUnder "taken" provision: Railroad built tracks down a Richmond,
Virginia, street on which claimant owned a shop. Practically all but pedes-,
trian traffic was obstructed. Damages denied as consequential. Myer v.
Richmond, (1898) 172 U. S.82, 19 Sup. Ct 106, 43 L. Ed. 374.
Under "taken, destroyed or damaged" provision: Highway moved behind claimant's farm house and between his house and barn. Necessary for
him to cross highway twice daily to get cattle to pasture. Damages allowed
for inconvenience. State v. Lambert, (1927) 171 Minn. 369, 214 N. W. 653.
Street vacated from a line in front of claimant's property fronting on a blind
alley. Damages allowed, though recognized as consequential. Court said
rule denying consequential damages had foundation in difficulty of determining precise damages in advance of condemnation. Experience after the
injury has occurred facilitates computation of damages. Vanderburgh v.
Minneapolis, (1906) 98 Minn. 329, 108 N. W. 480; Underwood v. Town
Board of Empire, (1944) 217 Minn. 385, 14 N. W. (2d) 459. State cut off
access of claimant to his farm in construction of broad "free-way" highway
with divided roadways. Held, damage payable. Petition of Buruquist, (Minn.1945) 19 N. W. (2d) 394. Recovery for discomfort, depreciation, noxious
fumes and unhealthfulness of public dump established near claimant's home.
Claimant elected to treat the invasion of his property as permanent. Compensation allowed for taking rather than damage. Donaldson v. Bismarck,
(1942) 71 N. Dak. 592, 3 N. W. (2d) 808.
No recovery whre bridge cut off light and view where claim was in
essence for right to view limited only by human vision. Ordinary street car
noise is a necessary incident to growth of a community and not compensable.
McCarthy v. Minneapolis, (1938) 203 Minn. 427, 281 N. W. 759. Distinguish,
though, smoke, noise and disturbance ordinarily attending proper operation
of railroads at and between stations and its distinction from damage from
switch yards, round houses, and other incidental facilities. Matthias v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., (1914) 125 Minn. 224, 146
N. W. 353.
141(When constitution covered taking only) Willis v. Winona, (1894)
59 Minn. 27, 60 N. W. 814.
142Apitz v. New Ulm, (1933) 189 Minn. 205, 248 N. W. 733; State v.
Stanley, (1933) 188 Minn. 390, 247 N. W. 509; In re Hull, (1925) 163
Minn. 439, 204 N. W. 534; Austin v. Hennepin County, (1915) 130 Minn.
359, 153 N. W. 738. No difference whether this is first grade or an improvement. Sallden v. Little Falls, (1907) 102 Minn. 358, 113 N. W. 884. Jury
may consider diversion of travel, inconvenience of access and dimunition of
business, but not loss of future profits. James Poultry, Co. v. Nebraska
City, (1939) 135 Neb. 787, 284 N. W. 273. Cannot enjoin the improvement,
Dynes v. Town of Kilkenny, (1922) 148 Minn. 329, 181 N. W. 859, 189 N. W.
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consequential aspect fades in importance. The intention was not
to enlarge on the substantive law of damages, but it was to make
that law uniform so that a property owner might recover against
a corporation that has the power of eminent domain under the
same circumstances that would have authorized recovery against
one not armed with that power. 14 3 The question becomes increasingly a more realistic one of how to protect the individual against
proximate losses in the light of expansions in governmental
functions in a complex business age. There is thus a growing
consciousness that it is the fair thing to do to spread the burden of
the imposition upon the individual's property over the shoulders
of the many who receive its benefits so that losses will not fall
too heavily on any one. The harshness of the federal attitude is
felt more keenly than ever when the federal government extends
its functions and compensates on its own concept of constitutional
principles and fails to keep pace with the fairer trend developed
in the very states where the property imposed upon is situated. 44
Control Over Navigable Waters
This may be illustrated in cases involving the development and
control of navigable waters where there has been considerable
incidental and consequential damage in the very states where constitutions require just compensation when private property is
"taken, destroyed or damaged" for a public purpose. It is normal to
think of one's physical property as being generally the subject of
439, or recover from public officers for changing of grade, Wallenberg v. Minneapolis, (1910) 111 Minn. 471, 127 N. W. 422. Even with state highway, city is
liable if it participates by approving change of grade, Maguire v. Crosby,
(1929) 178 Minn. 144, 226 N. W. 398; Foss v. Montevideo, (1929) 178 Minn.
430, 227 N. W. 357. When state highway passes through city, state highway commissioner must approve traffic control devices to be used, Automatic
Signal Advertising Co. v. Babcock, (1926) 166 Minn. 416, 208 N. W. 132.
Road diverts surface waters onto adjoining land. Recovery allowed. In
re Town Ditch No. 1, (1910) 208 Minn. 566, 295 N. W. 47. Overflows from
road cutting through drainage ditch treated as not consequential. Lage v.
Pottawattamie County, (1942) 232 Ia. 944, 5 N. W. (2d) 161.
143 Stuhl v. Great Northern Ry. Co., (1917) 136 Minn. 158, 161 N. W.
501, L.
R. A. 1917 D, 317.
144State law governs in state taking cases, within limits of Fourteenth
Amendment. Marchant v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., (1893) 153 U. S. 380,
14 Sup. Ct. 894, 38 L. Ed. 751. New rules of federal civil procedure do not
apply to federal condemnation proceedings. United States v. Certain Parcels,
(D. Md., 1941) 40 F. Supp. 436. "The possible importance of reserving to
the State jurisdiction for local purposes which involve no interference with
the performance of governmental functions is becoming more and more
clear as the activities of the Government expand and large areas within the
States are acquired."-Hughes, C. J., in James v. Dravo Contracting Co.,
(1937) 302 U. S. 134, 148, 58 Sup. Ct. 208, 215, 82 L. Ed. 155, 166.
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control by the state in which it is situated. The federal government
enters the picture in taking or damaging it as somewhat of a
stranger. For it to take and compensate less fairly than the.
claimant's state would have paid had it invaded his property naturally smacks to him of injustice. Because the number of states
compensating for taking, destruction or damaging has increased,
the subjective feeling of injustice becomes increasingly the practical objective standard throughout the nation. In all parts of the
country, it becomes reasonable to conclude that the federal government, through both Congress and the courts, should conform
its standard of compensation to changes generally in the national
'life. The growing control over navigable waters is but a single
field in which the Supreme Court has recognized the adaptability
of the Constitution to changing concepts of the functions the government may properly perform, but where its concepts of compensation under the Fifth Amendment require some new scrutiny.
The power of the federal government over navigable rivers
arises from the commerce clause of the Constitution. The Court
had early said that commerce includes navigation. 145 Subsequently
it said and repeated that the right of the United States in navigable
waters is limited to the control thereof for navigation purposes. 141
This power was further held to include the obstructing and diverting of navigation.147 Then the concept of the power expanded, and
the Court said the mere present non-navigability of a stream does
not mean that it may not be made navigable and therefore that
the United States may have power to improve or obstruct the water
now.1 48 When Congress attempted and failed to make the New
River navigable, and, though navigability is a factual question and
145Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824) 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23. And more recently
that it includes motor trucking, (1824) Madden v. Truckaway Corp., (D.
Minn. 4th, 1942) 46 F. Supp. 702, and aviation, State v. Northewest Airlines, Inc., (1942) 213 Minn. 395, 7 N. W. (2d) 691; Erickson v. King,
(1944)48 218 Minn. 98, 15 N. W. (2d) 201.
1 United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., (1926) 269 U. S.
411, 46 Sup. Ct. 144, 70 L. Ed. 339; Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Washington
Rd. Co.,
47 (1921) 255 U. S.56, 63, 41 Sup. Ct. 237, 239, 65 L. Ed. 500, 506.
. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., (1913) 229 U. S.
53, 33 Sup. Ct. 667, 57 L. Ed. 1063; South Carolina v. Georgia, (1876)
93 U. S. 4, 23 L. Ed. 782.
.4O8klahoma v. Atkinson Co. et al, (1941) 313 U. S.508, 61 Sup. Ct.
1050, 85 L. Ed. 1487, Mr. Justice Douglas saying it was sufficient for the
Court "that Congress has exercised its commerce power, though other purposes will also be 'served." Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
(1935) 297 U. S.288, 56 Sup. Ct. 466, 80 L. Ed. 688. Mississippi is navigable
above St. Anthony Falls, Olson v. United States, (1934) 292 U. S. 246, 54
Sup. Ct. 704, 78 L. Ed. 1236; Boom 'Co. v. Patterson, (1878) 98 U. S.403,
25 L. Ed. 206.

TORT AND IMPLIED CONTRACT LIABILITY

both the federal District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals
found that it was not navigable, the Supreme Court reversed them
both in United States v. AppalachianPower Companyj 4 concluded
that the federal power over waters was not limited to navigation, and
sustained the power of the Federal Power Commission to enjoin
a private power company from construction of a dam within the
river. It has recognized the authority of the United States in
navigable rivers for flood control purposes, and stated that the
power of flood control extends to the tributaries of navigable streams,
and that the power to promote commerce extends to the non-navigable stretches of a navigable river.150 The control over navigable
streams has not out and out been said to include controls for the
sole purpose of conducting governmental power projects. Yet
where the statute providing for the Boulder Dam project set forth
among other purposes that it was intended to include the promotion
of navigation, and it was argued that the mention of navigation was
a pure subterfuge by Congress to control the waters for the sole
purpose of a government-operated hydroelectric power project,
the Court refused to inquire what the actual motives of Congress
1
were.' 6
It is the rule in Minnesota that a riparian owner of land contiguous to a navigable river owns to low water mark.15 2 A railroad
had laid its tracks between high and low water marks along the
Mississippi River in the southern part of the state. The federal
government raised the level of the river to improve navigation, and
the railroad company was obliged to lay out more riprap to prevent
damage to its embankment. The federal rule was applied by the
Court, however, and recovery denied against the government on
the ground that riparian lands adjacent to a navigable river are
subject to the dominant power of the federal government up to
149(1940) 311 U. S. 377, 61 Sup. Ct. 291, 85 L. Ed. 243, in which Mr.
Justice Reed wrote, "Flood protection, watershed development, recovery of
the cost of improvements through utilization of power are likewise parts of
commerce
control."
'5 °Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., et al, supra, footnote 148.
5
2' Arizona v. California, (1931) 283 U. S. 423, 51 Sup. Ct. 522, 75 L. Ed.
1154. In connection with the T. V. A. project and the taking of a privatelyowned hydro-electric plant, the Court refused to consider authority given by
the state to condemn lands for the private project as an element of value,
since it was within the power of 'the state to revoke the authority, whether
or not it was probable that the state would revoke it. U. S. ex rel Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Powelson, (1943) 319 U. S. 266, 63 Sup. Ct. 1047, 87
L. Ed.
1390.
152 Minnesota v. Korrer, (1914) 127 Minn. 60, 148 N. W. 617, L. R. A
1916C 139; Morrill v. St. Anthony Falls Water-Power Co., (1879) 26 Minn
222, 2 N. W. 842; Patton on Titles (1938), Sec. 86.
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the high-water mark for the improvement of navigation. 53 This
will be noted, that the power of the federal government extends
to whatever of a claimant's property seems necessary to improve
the river for navigation ;-but if it imposes upon the riparian owner's
property below high water mark, it is not liable to pay for it,
whereas it must pay for a taking of property above high water
mark. This would indicate a limitation upon riparian ownership
of property, not a right to-take property without paying for it"154
It is not true that the government is not under obligation to pay
merely because it is exercising a constitutional power to improve
the river. The government simply does not "take" the claimant's
property until high water mark is reached; otherwise it only damages it. Had the state itself made the improvement in this case
with the permission of the federal government, it is assumed that
the state would be under obligation to pay for damage above the
low water point.1 55
The federal rule seems more harsh when the riparian land is
owned by an individual, and his way to the water, is blocked
entirely. Such a claimant owned land on the St. Mary's River in
Michigan, having especial value for its easy access to the channel
for loading and unloading. The government built a pier on the
submerged portion of his land. Not only did this cut off the
claimant's access to the stream, but the superintendent of the pier refused to allow him to use the pier in order to get access. The government had not "taken" the claimant's property -within the meaning
of the, Fifth Amendment but had used its own, according to the
Supreme Court, and the damage to his land had been merely
consequential and accordingly not compensable.Y58
53
1 United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad
Co., (1941) 312 U. S.592, 313 U. S. 543, 61 Sup. Ct. 772, 85 L. Ed. 1064.
State law as to riparian rights is subject to dominent power of federal
government over navigation, Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Commission
of Wisconsin, (1927) 274 U. S.651, 47 Sup. Ct. 669, 71 L. Ed. 1279; Fish v.

Chicago, Gt. Western Rd. Co., (1914) 125 Minn. 380, 147 N. W. 431. Definition of bed of river, Alabama v. Georgia, (1859) 23 How. 505, 515, 16 L. Ed.
556, 560. Definition of high and low water marks, Tiffany Real Property,
Third 4Ed., 1939, Sec. 661.
M5For some purposes, navigable waters "are the public property of the
nation."-Swayne, J., in Gilman v. Philadelphia, (1865) 3 Wall. 713, 18
96.
L. Ed.
155Bradshaw v. Duluth Imperial Mill Co., (1892) 52 Minn. 59, 53 N. W.
1066; Union Depot v. Brunswick, (1883) 31 Minn. 101, 47 Am. Rep. 789.
Condemnation of shore premises conveys riparian rights for which compensation must be made, Hanford v. St. Paul & D. R. Co., (1890) 43 Minn.
104, 42
N. W. 596, 44 N. W. 144.
' 56 Scranton v. Wheeler, (1900) 1.79 U. S.141, 21 Sup. Ct. 48, 45 L. Ed.
126. No recovery: Government dike substantially destroyed landing place

TORT AND IMPLIED CONTRACT LIABILITY

Among the classics of the earlier river control cases is that
of United States v. Cress,57 in which a lock and dam constructed
by the United States in a navigable river adversely affected the
flow of a tributary non-navigable stream so that the claimant's
mill on it could no longer be driven by water power. This, according to the Court, was not a consequential damage. There had been
a partial taking, the interest taken being less than the fee. "The
right to have the water flow away from the mill dam unobstructed,
except as in the course of nature, is not a mere easement or appurtenance, but exists by the law of nature as an inescapable part
of the land."'" 5
on island owned by claimant, Gibson v. United States, (1897) 166 U. S. 269,
17 Sup. Ct. 578, 41 L. Ed. 996. Government levee on one side of river caused

occasional overflows of claimant's land on other side, Jackson v. United
States, (1912) 230 U. S.1, 33 Sup. Ct. 1011, 57 L. Ed. 1363. Raised water of
river up between low and high water mark so that claimant could no longer
drain his land into river, Mills v. United States, (S. D. Ga., 1891) 46 Fed.
738. Dredged claimant's salt water oyster beds, Lewis Blue Point Oyster
Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, (1913) 229 U. S. 82, 33 Sup. Ct. 679, 57 L. Ed.
1083. Bridge once lawfully constructed with permission of state now ordered
down by federal government, Union Bridge Co. v. United States, (1907)
204 U. S.364, 27 Sup. Ct. 367, 51 L. Ed. 523. Same as to wharf, Greenleaf
Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, Sec. of War, (1915) 237 U. S. 268, 35
Sup. Ct. 551, 59 L. Ed. 947. Erosion of claimant's land caused by revetments
constructed in river, Bedford v. United States, (1904) 192 U. S. 217, 24
Sup. Ct. 238, 48 L. Ed. 414. Constructed lighthouse on claimant's submerged land under claim of right. Impossible to establish implied contract, Hill v. United States, (1893) 149 U. S.593, 13 Sup. Ct. 238, 48 L. Ed.
414. Wrongfully dug up portions of claimant's land believing it was part
of river bed. No implied contract, Tempel v. United States, (1918) 248 U. S.
121, 39 Sup. Ct. 56, 63 L. Ed. 162.
Recovery allowed where permanent intermittent flooding of claimant's
land, United States v. Willis (C. C. A. 4th, 1944) 141 F. (2d) 314; Pumpelly
v. Green Bay Co., (1871) 13 Wall. 166, 20 L. Ed. 557. Landowner cannot
enjoin members of river commission from making improvements, Cubbins v.
Mississippi River Commission, (1916) 241 U. S.351, 36 Sup. Ct. 671, 60 L. Ed.
1041.
157243 U. S.316, 37 Sup. Ct. 380, 61 L. Ed. 746 (1917).
IrgTo like effect, recognizing a right in the flow of the water under
Minnesota law, Pike Rapids Power Co. v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault
Ste. Marie Ry. Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) 99 F. (2d) 902, cert. denied, (1939)
305 U. S.660, 59 Sup. Ct. 362, 83 L. Ed. 428, rehearing denied, 306 U. S.
667, 59 Sup. Ct. 487; Petraborg v. Zontelli, (1944) 217 Minn. 536, 15 N. W.
(2d) 174; Schaefer v. Marthaler, (1886) 32 Minn. 487, 26 N. W. 726. See
Kinyon, "What Can a Riparian Proprietor Do?" in 21 Minn. L. Rev. 512
(1937) in which that author discusses the "natural flow" and "reasonable
use" theories as to flowing water and supports the concept that riparian
owners do have a legally protected right in the flow. Supporting "reasonable
use" theory, Minnesota Canal & Power Co. v. Fall Lake Boom Co., (1914)
127 Minn. 23, 148 N. W. 561; Meyers v. Lafayette Club, (1936) 197 Minn.
241, 266 N. W. 861 ; Red River Roller Mills v. Wright, (1883) 30 Minn. 249,
15 N. W. 167. The state is said to hold the navigable waters for public use;
and to that holding riparian ownership is subject, Nelson v. DeLong, (1942)
213 Minn. 425, 7 N. W. (2d) 342. Private corporation with authority from
Federal Power Commission for hydroelectric power project on navigable
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In the Cress case, the mill was some fair distance up the tributary from the navigable river. In United States v. Willow River
Power Company, recently decided,' 59 there was involved a privatelyowned hydroelectric plant on the non-navigable Willow River but
a short distance in from the navigable St. Croix. The drop of
the water from the dam was 22.5 feet. The St. Croix flovs into
the Mississippi; and a dam on that river at Red Wing, Minnesota,
raised the level of the St. Croix at the foot of the Willow by three
feet and impaired the efficiency of the private plant accordingly.
Claim was made only for this impairment and not for any taking
of fast lands. The Court of Claims allowed recovery on the ground
that there had been a taking. The Supreme Court disagreed,
however, and denied recovery. It expressly reaffirmed the Cress
case. Yet Mr. Justice Jackson stated that the economic interest
in the flow of the water involved in the instant case was not legally
protectable, and that the doctrine of riparian rights on non-navigable
waters was intended to apply especially to waters flowing through
pastures, or usuable in irrigation, or to shifting courses, and
was aimed usually at narrow streams and at settling conflicts between different riparian owners. That sort of stream was involved
in the Cress case as he viewed it. He pointed out that various economic losses are non-compensable when the government extends
its functions, and added that "the Fifth Amendment ... undertakes
to redistribute certain economic losses inflicted by public improvements . . . It does not undertake, however, to socialize all losses."

At the same time, in United States v. Commodore Park,Inc., 60
it was held that the Fifth Amendment did not require the government to compensate an owner of residential property continguous
to a non-navigable creek for filling the creek with mud and silt
dug from a navigable bay into which it flowed. The waters in the
creek were made stale and stagnant. The beauty of the property
was spoiled. The land, a mile up the creek from the bay, was
reduced in value because of the loss of boating, fishing, swimming
and the like. The purpose of the'dredging had been to provide
suitable waters for the Navy for the operation of large seaplanes.
It was immaterial, according to Mr. Justice, Black, that the law
river in New York held liable under New York law for effect of project in
reducing water head for power at another private corporation's dam, Henry
Ford & Son, Inc. v. Little Falls Fibre Co., (1929) 280 U. S. 369, 50 Sup.
Ct. 140, 74 L. Ed. 483.
159 (1945) 65 Sup. Ct. 761, 89 L. Ed: 709.
1'8 'United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., (1945) 65 Sup. Ct. 803,
89 L. Ed. 722.
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of Virginia where the land was situated recognized the "technical"
title of the claimant to a portion of the non-navigable creek bed.161
Depreciation and Moving Expenses
The position of the government that it need not pay for losses
caused by it simply because of their being consequential found particular opposition in cases of taking real property where the claimant
was left with fixtures on his hands no longer of value to him or
where he was put to the expense of moving to other premises.
These'items, it was argued, should be considered as elements of
just compensation for the whole that was taken. While on the
New York bench, Judge Cardozo was positive in saying, "It is
intolerable that the state, after condemning a factory or warehouse,
should surrender to the owner a stock of secondhand machinery
and in so doing discharge the full measure of its duty. Severed
from the building, such machinery commands only the prices of
secondhand articles; attached to a going plant, it may produce
162
an enhancement of value as great as it did when new."'
Nevertheless, most federal courts denied consideration of these
items. 0 3 They constituted losses which the claimant would be obliged

to bear himself and which would not be spread by the government.
It looked as' if the subject would be finally determined, however,
14
in United States v. GeneralMotors Corporation.'
The corporation
was renting certain premises under a twenty-year lease, and the
government requisitioned the premises for a portion of the term.
It would be necessary for the corporation to move out, and later
16lCf.: "This riparian right is property and is valuable ...It is a right
of which, when once vested, the owner can only be deprived of . . .for the
public good, upon due compensation."-Miller, J., in Yates v. Milwaukee,

(1870) 10 Wall. 497, 504, 19 L. Ed. 984, 986.
lo62Jackson v. New York, (1914) 213 N. Y. 34, 106 N. E. 758. See,
also, Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry v. Des Moines, (1924) 197 Ia. 1082,
198 N.3 W. 486.
16United States v. Becktold Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1942) 129 F. (2d) 473;
Potomac Electric Power Co. v. United States, (Ct of App., D. C., 1936)
85 F. (2d) 243, cert. denied in (1936) 299 U. S.565, 57 Sup. Ct.27, 81 L. Ed.
416; Gershon Bros. Co. v. United States (C. C. A. 5th, 1922) 284 Fed. 849;
Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Warm Springs Irrigation District, (C. C. A. 9th,
1921) 270 Fed. 555; United States v. Building, 651 Brannan Street, (N. D.

Calif. S. D., 1944) 55 F. Sup. 667; United States v. Certain Parcels in San
Diego, (S. D. Calif. S. D., 1944) 54 F. Supp. 561; United States v. 0.64 Acres,
(S. D. Calif. Central Div., 1944) 54 F. Supp. 562; United States v. Entire
Fifth Floor, (S. D., N. Y., 1944) 54 F. Supp. 258; United States v. Improved
Premises, (S. D., N. Y., 1944) 54 F. Supp. 469; Acme Die-Casting Corp. v.
United States, (1935) 81 Ct. Cl. 415; Howard Co. v. United States, (1935)
81 Ct. Cl. 646; Wrigley, Jr. Co. v. United States, (1932) 75 Ct. Cl. 569.
164(1945) 65 Sup. Ct. 357, 89 L. Ed. 379.
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to go to the expense of moving back in again when the government's
occupancy had ended. The theory of the government was that
it was obliged to pay no more than for the value of the floor space,
and that this value would be the same whether the premises were
taken while occupied or vacant. The majority on the Circuit
Court of Appeals 165 condemned the government theory as hard,
on the ground that it was consistent with the benefits the government would receive but not with what was taken from the claimant.
The Supreme Court, though divided, allowed recovery for the
market value of the term for which the premises were taken and
for damage and depreciation of the fixtures, and held that the
cost of the claimant in moving equipment may be considered in
determining the value of the short term taken. " . . . the depriva-

tion of the former owner rather than the accretion of a right or
interest to the sovereign constitutes the taking," said Mr. Justice
Roberts in his majqrity opinion. It was agreed that the moving
expenses thus allowed could not have been considered had the
entire fee been taken. Justices Frankfurter and Murphy and
Chief Justice Stone took no part in the consideration of the case.
Mr. Justice Roberts who wrote the majority opinion is no longer
on the Court. Justices Douglas and Black concurred with the
majority only in "part and disagreed as to reflecting the cost of
moving in the award. MrJustice Douglas said in fact, "If we
allow the offer of proof in the present case, the result will be to
let consequential damages in under a new guise."
Insofar as the General Motors decision did not deny compensation solely because some form of consequential damage seemed to
be involved, it should have a strong appeal to the public's sense of
fairness. The case opened the way for another turning point at
which the Court could have fit the concept of condemnation compensation to the times' 66 even as it had enlarged the concept of the
government's power as to the taking aspect in the law of eminent
domain. The Circuit Court of Appeals of the 10th Circuit saw no reason for confining the General Motors holding to its particular facts.
It allowed a similar type of damages in the case of requisition of an
entire term of a lease rather than a portion of one. The case went
165 General Motors Corporation v. United States, (C. C. A. 7th, 1944)
140 F. (2d) 873.
166See, for adverse criticism but our conclusion, Dolan, "'Just Compensation' and the General Motors Case," 31 Va. L. Rev. 540 (1945). The
author of that article is a special assistant to the Attorney General, in charge
of all condemnation proceedings by the United States in the Eastern and
Southern Districts of New York.
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to the Supreme Court on writs of certiorari in United States v.
Petty Motor Company,16 7 however, and that Court determined that
in allowing such damages the Court of Appeals had been in error.
In delivering the opinion of the Court in this case, Mr. Justice
Reed declared:
"The constitution and the statutes do not define the meaning of
just compensation. But it has come to be recognized that just compensation is the value of the interest taken. This is not the value
to the owner for his particular purposes or to the condemnor for
some special use but a so-called 'market value.' It is recognized that
an owner often receives less than the value of the property to him
but experience has shown that the rule is reasonably satisfactory.
Since 'market value' does not fluctuate with the needs of the condemnor or condemnee but with general demand for the property,
evidence of loss of profits, damage to a good will, the expense of
relocation and other consequential losses are refused in federal
condemnation proceedings."
The measure of damages in the Petty Motor Company case
was the difference between the value of the use and occupancy of
the leasehold for the remainder of the tenant's term, plus the value
of any right on the part of the lessee to renew the lease, less the
agreed rent which the tenant would pay for such use and occupancy.
III.
CONCLUSION

A taking by the government under its power of eminent domain, realistically approached, need not be considered by way
either of contract or of tort. The right to take for a public purpose is an incident of sovereignty. The Constitution imposes as
a limitation upon its exercise the requirement that just compensation be paid for what is taken. Neither is the taking a wrong, nor
"just compensation" capable of being fairly determined on ariy basis
limited'to the reasonable value of the property physically taken
into possession by the government. The fact of damage or loss,
from the angle of fairness, ought neither be admitted in evidence
nor excluded on the sole ground that there is damage as distinguished from actual taking or that the element considered is
consequential. The question should be, rather, when consequential,
as to how remote or proximate it may be. 6 8 How reasonably real
167(1946) 66 Sup. Ct. 596. For Circuit Court of Appeals decision (1945),
see 147
F. (2d) 912.
'69AcCormack, "Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain," 41
Yale L. Jour. 221 (1931).
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is the loss resulting from the imposition upon the property by the
government so that in fairness compensation should be made to
the claimant to put him into as good a position pecuniarily as he
would have been in had no imposition upon his property been made?
The Supreme Court has not been oblivious to the fact that
there have been harsh results. It has emphasized in the later cases
that the remedy lies in the lap of Congress. It is submitted that
the Court does have precedent on which to accomplish a fairer
result than seems to have obtained already. The onus of the
remedy, nevertheless, will have to be provided by statute, and
the immediate question is as to what legislation should be enacted.
A general federal statute should be passed to provide, what
various state constitutions now provide, that compensation shall
be made for the taking, damage or destruction of property for
public purpose. The federal government could fit into the fairer
trend for determining compensation already developed in a number of the states.
Congress should waive entirely the immunity of the federal
government from general tort liability. 69 This position was
strongly advocated shortly after the first World War. There was
alarm even then atthe rate at which the government was taking
over functions formerly performed by private enterprise. When
tort damage is inflicted by private persons, the injfired person
may recover; but as the functions of government displace private
enterprise, the protection to the individual as to tort damage
that may be inflicted upon him increasingly diminishes. The
burden can more easily be borne when distributed about to the shoulders of many than when left to lie upon a single innocent injured
person. The American Bar Association strongly advocated such
legislation, and came extremely close to achieving success. 170 Since
Congress is willing to provide for the gratuitous administrative
settlement of some tort claims and to have the government sued
on some others, it seems no huge departure to provide for payment
of all such claims as a matter of right as shall be determined by
169 Borchard, "Government Liability in Tort," 34 Yale L. four. 1, 129,
229 (1924-1925). Suggesting government-owned corporation may even now
be sued in tort, Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., (1939)
321 U. S. 503, 64 Sup. Ct. 641, 88 L. Ed. 892. That it may not be sued in,
tort under stated facts, Grant v. Tennessee Valley Authority, (E. D. Tenn.,
1942) 40 F. Supp. 564.
170Separate bills passed both houses of Congress in the 69th Congress.
The Federal Torts Bill was indorsed in principle by the President in his
message to the 77th Congress. It was passed by the Senate, but the House
did not act on it. It was introduced again in the 78th Congress.
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the courts. Data should be available from claims heretofore filed
in Congress so that determination can be pretty well made in advance as to what the tort claims for a coming year are apt to be.
Recent treatment of financial matters by the government has been
such that unpredictability should no longer be alarming even if
such claims are not well predictable in advance. If Congress should
insist upon further predictability, however, it can limit the amount
of tort recovery in the courts for which any one person can sue
in a single case, and thus leave it with Congress itself to allow
larger claims by special statute.
It is difficult to justify on principle the unwillingness of the
government to conform itself to the same moral standards in its
transactions as private individuals are held to in transactions between
themselves. The rule should not be departed from that the government officer or employee should have actual as distinguished from
apparent authority before the government is bound; for there is
necessarily a problem in keeping the large mass of government
employees within the bounds of proper action. When actual authority is once established, however, no reason is perceived why the
United States should not be subject to suit in quasi contract. The
present limitation in that regard could easily be remedied by an
amendment to the Tucker Act. And in making such amendment,
it is suggested that the words "not sounding in tort" be removed
from it.
Various of the states, finally, have made some provision for
waiving immunity from proceeding against them in some very
limited categories of cases.' 7 ' If the constitutional eminent domain
provisions of any state are not self-executing so as to waive the
immunity of the state from suit in such cases, that state should
legislate a general waiver of immunity from such suit. In the
interests of uniformity, states which have not done so might well
provide, even by general statute, for just compensation for the
public taking, damage or destruction of private property. The
states should go still further, however, and should provide that
they be open to suit against them the same as private persons are,
7
7'Pound, "A Survey of Public Interests," 58 Harv. L. Rev. 909 (1945).
"If I were a member of the legislative branch of the government considering the advisability of establishing a court of claims with tort jurisdiction
upon existing tribunals as against the state, the reasons advanced by the
majority would be persuasive. Functions now performed by the state seem to
demand legislation of that character!"-Loring, J., (now Chief Justice) in
State v. Stanley, (1933) 188 Minn. 390, 395, 247 N. W. 509, 511.
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whether in contract, express or implied, quasi contract, or in tort. 172
The theme upon which these conclusions are based is that
there is nothing inconsistent between the sovereignty of the federal
government or of a state and its liability to suit in court on obligations which, by established legal concepts as between private persons, the government morally ought to pay. It is believed that the
fairness, the -spirit and the motives by which 'social and governmental changes are accomplished bear some relationship to their
permanency and ultimate success. The position expressed by Mr.
Justice Brewer while on the Supreme Court should become more
important as government powers and functions are extended, that
"in any society the fullness and sufficiency of the securities which
surround the individual in the use and enjoyment of his property
constitute one of the most certain tests of the character and value
'
of the government."178
172 Peterson, "Government Responsibility for Torts in Minnesota," 26
Minn. 3L. Rev. 293, 480, 613, 700, 854 (1942).
l7 Monongehela Navigation Co. v. United States, (1892) 148 U. S. 312,
324, 13 Sup. Ct. 622, 625, 37 L. Ed. 463, 467.

